The Little Biodiversity Finance Book by unknown
The
Little
Biodiversity
Finance
Book
A guide to proactive 
investment in natural 
capital (PINC)
3ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This publication is supported by the CBD Secretariat
and produced with the financial assistance of the Prince Albert II of Monaco Foundation
The editorial costs were supported by the Ashden Trust. The core costs of the Global 
Canopy Programme are supported entirely by voluntary donations from foundations 
including The Rufford Maurice Laing Foundation, The Waterloo Foundation, The John 
Ellerman Foundation, The Millichope Foundation, CHK Charities, Ernest Kleinwort 
Charitable Trust and donations from individuals. We thank all of them for this 
valuable support.
We are continually aiming to improve the Little Biodiversity Finance Book and your 
feedback is welcome. 
 
Please send comments to Charlie Parker 
c.parker@globalcanopy.org
Authors: Charlie Parker, Matthew Cranford
For more information contact: c.parker@globalcanopy.org
Contributions to the text were gratefully received from:
CBD Secretariat
Becca Madsen, Ecosystem Marketplace
Josh Donlan, Advanced Conservation Strategies
Jonah Busch, Conservation International
Peiter van Eijk, Wetlands International
Leif Pedersen, Rainforest Alliance
Jessica Brown, Overseas Development Institute
Josh Bishop, IUCN
FAS Team
Nathaniel Caroll, Ecosystem Marketplace
© Global Canopy Foundation 2010
This is the first edition of the Little Biodiversity Finance Book 
First Published October 2010.
Published by: Global Canopy Programme, John Krebs Field 
Station, Oxford OX2 8QJ, UK.
Designed by Company
www.company-london.com
The Global Canopy Programme is an alliance of 37 scientific 
institutions in 19 countries, which lead the world in forest canopy 
research, education and conservation. Today, our three main 
programmes - in science, policy and finance aim to define and 
explore the range and economic value of forest ecosystem services 
and to share our findings with decision-makers in government 
and finance.
Visit www.globalcanopy.org for more information.
TEÓFILO DE LA TORRE ARGÜELLO, 
ENVIRONMENT MINISTER OF COSTA RICA
In its effort to establish a model of sustainable development, Costa Rica faced the 
challenge of protecting its biological wealth while promoting the country’s economic and 
social development. The courageous decision to keep roughly 26% of land area protected 
allows Costa Rica to preserve representative samples of its rich biodiversity while 
generating significant income from the sustainable use of the ecosystem services this 
area provides. A study published by the International Centre for Economic Policy for 
Sustainable Development of the National University of Costa Rica shows that, by the year 
2009, the total contribution of national parks and biological reserves to the national 
economy was approximately USD 1.5 million. This was generated from activities such as 
tourism, the protection of water resources for hydropower generation, community water 
supply, scientific research, and other environmental services.
Nonetheless, the investment that the Costa Rican government has made to protect and 
conserve ecosystem services and biodiversity remains inadequate.  It has not been 
possible to meet the demand for the benefits ecosystem services can provide or the human 
resources, infrastructure, technology, and capacity building that protected areas 
require to ensure their permanence and sustainability. Meeting the commitments made 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and other relevant conventions such as the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and The Ramsar 
Convention is especially challenging. The need for maintaining and expanding current 
levels of bilateral and multilateral cooperation has never been as pronounced.
A striking example of this cooperation is expected to emerge from the implementation of 
the Forever Costa Rica Project, which was submitted as an Expression of Interest to the 
CBD LifeWeb Initiative last year. The Project’s primary objective is to achieve the goals of 
the Programme of Work on Protected Areas of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(Decision VII/28). The CBD LifeWeb Initiative provides a clear window of opportunity to 
access various financial resources at the global level. 
To date, Costa Rica’s social and environmental achievements are undoubtedly the result 
of robust environmental policy that recognizes the value of ecosystem services and 
biodiversity for economic development. Similarly, the establishment of transparent, 
participatory, and inclusive mechanisms for the use of national financial resources and 
international cooperation is crucial, including the development of a local Environmental 
Service Market in partnership with the government and the private sector.  In this light, 
we urge other countries to establish or offer financial support for similarly constructive 
models which demonstrate clear local and global benefits.
4 5
DR. NORBERT RÖTTGEN, 
ENVIRONMENT MINISTER OF GERMANY
Biological diversity is the foundation of all human societies and a prerequisite for 
sustainable economic development. This fact is amply demonstrated by the ongoing 
global study on “The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity” (TEEB). TEEB also 
shows that the cost of sustaining biodiversity and ecosystem services is lower than the 
cost of allowing the further deterioration of biodiversity and ecosystem services 
Nevertheless, and despite the concerted efforts of the international community to protect 
biodiversity and the provision of corresponding ecosystem services, biodiversity loss 
continues to occur at an unprecedented rate. On a global scale, we are falling short of our 
goals to reduce and eventually halt the rate of biodiversity loss. Financing is clearly one 
of our greatest impediments to implementing these commitments. The financing gap for 
biodiversity conservation continues to widen. Mobilizing financial resources for 
biodiversity conservation has always been one Germany’s priorities in the context of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The cost of inaction is too great to ignore this 
global problem. 
The range of financing mechanisms and platforms outlined in this book conveys the 
current international commitment to biodiversity. However, much work remains to meet 
the levels of funding required to achieve the objectives of the CBD. The current state of 
biodiversity decline calls for immediate and effective action of the international 
community. Without the cooperation between governments, donors, NGOs and local 
communities, the private sector and increased financial support for conservation 
projects, achieving the goals of the CBD will be impossible. In the field of climate change, 
Germany has already developed an innovative financing instrument, the International 
Climate Initiative of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety. This initiative is funded through revenues of the sale of carbon emission 
allowances. However, the fight against climate change will not be effective if we do not 
succeed in achieving the conservation and sustainable management of large, carbon-
rich ecosystems. Acting against climate change and conserving biodiversity are two 
sides of the same coin. 
We therefore also make use of the International Climate Initiative to support projects for 
the conservation of climate-relevant biodiversity in developing, newly industrialising 
and transition countries. As the Little Biodiversity Finance Book illustrates, as part of 
these efforts we support projects profiled through the CBD s´ LifeWeb clearing-house that 
serve to strengthen the implementation of the Convention´ s programme of work on 
protected areas. I welcome the publication of the Little Biodiversity Finance Book which 
highlights a multitude of innovative and practical ways in which we can generate finance 
for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. I am convinced that it comes at a 
very opportune moment and I am certain that this useful book will be widely used.
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MR. AHMED DJOGHLAF, 
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE CBD
Today biodiversity is being lost more quickly than ever. The current rate of extinction is 
estimated to be up to 1,000 times higher than the natural background rate. If this trend 
does not change, it is expected that an area of 1.3 billion hectares worldwide – about 1.5 
times the United States – will completely lose its original biodiversity levels by 2050.
It is no exaggeration to say that our quality of life will suffer tremendously if we continue 
to lose biodiversity at this rate. We depend on biodiversity for everything from food, fuel 
and medicines, to air and water purification and the pollination of wild plants and crops. 
But despite the great importance of biodiversity to human wellbeing, the far-reaching 
consequences of biodiversity loss are not adequately reflected in the levels of financing 
currently being spent on biodiversity.
The lack of sufficient financial resources is one of the main obstacles to achieving the 
Convention’s objectives. At the ninth meeting of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
the Conference of the Parties (COP) adopted a strategy to enhance international financial 
flows and domestic funding for biodiversity. As part of this strategy, COP 9 invited 
Parties to come forward with new and innovative financing mechanisms and requested 
the Executive Secretary to support the diffusion of such initiatives. Along the same lines, 
COP 10 in Nagoya this year is expected to encourage Parties to implement the strategy at 
the national level, take an active part in ongoing processes to enhance innovative 
biodiversity financing, and engage in a global discussion on the need and possible 
modalities of innovative financing systems. 
We are increasingly seeing encouraging signs of new and innovative sources of 
biodiversity financing, such as Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES), and related 
investments of the private sector. For example, Mexico has generated over USD 300 
million for forest conservation in the past seven years through its ‘Payments of 
Hydrological Environmental Services of Forests’ scheme. Such excellent initiatives, 
which exist in many countries, should be scaled up and replicated widely. 
The Little Biodiversity Finance Book is an excellent sourcebook for these efforts to draw 
on. It provides a simple and easy introduction to existing financial mechanisms in 
support of biodiversity. As such, it will be an indispensible tool, making biodiversity 
financing options more accessible for both newcomers to this field and national and 
international policy makers. Clearly, no task could be more timely or important. As the 
slogan of the International Year of Biodiversity 2010 reminds us: Biodiversity is life… 
biodiversity is OUR life.
DR. CHRISTIAN MERSMANN, 
MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE GLOBAL MECHANISM OF THE UNCCCD
The UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) recognises that promoting 
biological diversity and combating desertification are inextricably linked .
Preserving biodiversity is essential if we are to prevent the degradation of land, 
particularly in vulnerable dryland areas, on which human well-being and sustainable 
development depends.
The CBD community has developed an array of policy and financial instruments to 
conserve biodiversity and protect the world’s ecosystems.  Government institutions, 
civil society organisations, businesses and communities are now testing these 
mechanisms, from public infrastructure investments to businesses paying farmers for 
environmental services.
Given the synergies between the CBD and UNCCD, many biodiversity financing 
instruments and mechanisms are relevant for efforts to prevent and mitigate 
desertification and promote sustainable land management. This publication provides 
a comprehensive yet concise and understandable overview of financial mechanisms, 
and we welcome it in helping to facilitate understanding, encourage discussion, and 
inspire decision makers and land users.  
The Global Mechanism, as a subsidiary body of the UNCCD, is exploring some of these 
financial mechanisms in an integrated national context.  As called for by the 2008-2018 
UNCCD Strategy, we provide strategic and technical support to governments’ efforts to 
develop investment frameworks that support the implementation of the UNCCD 
National Action Programmes.  We are eager to continue sharing our experiences with 
the CBD community for the development of biodiversity country resource mobilisation 
strategies and pursue financing synergies at country level. 
The international community is increasingly recognising the value of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services, while public and private investments in agriculture, food security 
and climate change adaptation and mitigation are on the rise.  These trends present a 
perfect opportunity for the Rio Conventions and their partners to provide leadership and 
guidance – in a spirit of transparency, efficiency and harmony – to develop resource 
mobilisation strategies in a broader sustainable development context.  As a UNCCD 
institution, we look forward to taking up that challenge.
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THINK PINC
WHY THE WORLD NEED’S PROACTIVE INVESTMENT IN NATURAL CAPITAL
The English playwright Oscar Wilde once commented that the cynic knows the price of 
everything but the value of nothing. Today’s cynics are those who claim biodiversity is 
priceless, yet are not prepared to pay for it. Biodiversity and the vast ecosystem services 
it provides, underpins climate, food, energy, health and livelihood security for humanity 
at local to global scales. You can count these securities off on each finger and literally hold 
the future of the earth in the palm of your hand.
Our societal dilemma is that we do not pay the true cost of the things we use. A bar of 
chocolate consumed in a Parisian café does not reflect the costs of the biodiversity lost in 
Asian forest destruction caused by the demand for palm oil contained within it. Latin 
beefsteaks consumed in Sao Paulo or New York, do not bear the environmental costs of 
the carbon emissions caused by the deforestation of the amazon for cattle pasture. 
Beautiful flowers bought by consumers in Europe do not account for the over fertilised 
lakes of Africa that are their hidden collateral damage.
In this UN year of Biodiversity a quiet revolution is occurring. Whilst the Millennium 
Development Goals for stemming biodiversity loss may be missed, the financial crisis is 
forcing a re-think of how products and services are valued. Investors are thinking, ‘if we 
got it so wrong with one property, what else out there is incorrectly valued?’ There is a 
growing realisation that wealth creation cannot continue based on financial and social 
capital alone, but must recognise natural capital too – for without this, national 
accounts, business accounts and consumer accounts – long term, are ultimately 
built on sand.
This book charts the current status of biodiversity finance globally. We have discovered 
there is much we do not know. The full scale and effectiveness of financing for 
biodiversity remains elusive. Looking back at today’s cash flows for biodiversity, bears 
no reflection of what is needed or may be delivered tomorrow. An economic paradigm 
predicated largely on existence values has failed biodiversity. A morpho butterfly’s 
beauty will never outbid the Mona Lisa. The change coming, is a realisation that a more 
workable means of capturing value for biodiversity, at least in global markets, could be 
based on the USD trillion ecosystem services it provides to us all.
The Little Biodiversity Finance Book is also a guide for much needed ‘Proactive 
Investment in Natural Capital’. PINC provides a conceptual framework for future 
financing for biodiversity and the ecosystem services it provides which underpin wealth 
creation (Trivedi et al., 2009).  It is a natural follow on from REDD (Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries), which is essentially 
valuing one such service, namely the carbon cycle. REDD under the UNFCCC however, 
cannot capture the value of the numerous other services that ecosystems provide. 
This opportunity falls to economic innovators, perhaps stimulated by government 
interventions through, for example, the CBD and proposed instruments such as the 
‘Green Development Mechanism’. 
Such a utilitarian view of biodiversity should not be allowed to erode the inestimable 
value it has for the human spirit but should secure it for future generations. It must also 
equitably enhance the wellbeing of the rural poor, whose livelihoods are closer to natural 
capital, than those of city dwellers, increasingly removed from it. It is those who live with 
biodiversity, who do so much to sustain the natural capital upon which the rest of the 
world depends and they should be rewarded for maintaining it.
Inside this book you will find the seeds of a new economy. One in which the contribution 
of the biosphere to our wellbeing becomes an opportunity for positive economic flows. 
This new economy could see the emergence of ‘biodiversity superpowers’ rich in natural 
capital and able to bargain their ecological muscle for aid or trade. This offers a 
comparative advantage to emerging economies, especially in developing countries that 
have retained much of their biodiversity intact. 
Andrew W. Mitchell
Founder and Director
Global Canopy Programme
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HOW DOES THIS BOOK HELP?
 
With hundreds of billions of dollars needed for development and climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, it initially seems a difficult task to finance biodiversity at 
the level required. The Little Biodiversity Finance Book aims to dispel this impression 
by clearly laying out options for financing biodiversity and ecosystem services and 
by highlighting the need and potential for synergies not only between financing 
mechanisms, but also between financing sources earmarked for development, climate 
change and biodiversity.
The aim of the Little Biodiversity Finance Book is to help key stakeholders including 
governments, NGOs, the private sector, indigenous peoples and local communities to 
compare existing and future options for biodiversity and ecosystem finance in a clear 
and consistent way. To do this, this publication introduces an overarching framework 
that organises financial mechanisms under three main headings: revenue generation, 
delivery and institutional arrangements. These modules can be thought of as independent 
building blocks that can be arranged in a ‘mix and match’ approach, choosing the most 
suitable options from each module to create a more effective, efficient, and equitable 
financial system.
To allow assessment and comparison of the various options within each module we 
present a set of common criteria, derived from core principles that have emerged within 
the biodiversity negotiations and the considerable background work by NGOs, IGOs and 
policy makers. These criteria have been presented graphically using icons that are 
introduced within each section and shown on the inside back cover for quick reference.
As a non-partisan analysis, the Little Biodiversity Finance Book does not favour one 
proposal over another. We do hope, however, that our work will aid understanding 
and encourage dialogue on this vitally important yet globally unrecognised and 
unrewarded area.
This publication is a first attempt to understand and evaluate the range of options for 
financing biodiversity and ecosystem services.  In compiling it, we have realised that 
whilst there is a wealth of information on this subject there is still much that we do not yet 
know or understand.  In particular we found that evidence of the current scale of finance 
was barely available, as were estimates for the current financial needs for protecting global 
biodiversity and ecosystem services. To address these gaps we aim to build on the work of 
this study and encourage you to send us your feedback so that we can continue to develop 
this resource
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UNDERSTANDING
BIODIVERSITY
WHAT IS BIODIVERSITY?
Biodiversity in its broadest sense is the richness of life on earth. 
More specifically, though, biodiversity is defined under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) as: ‘The variability 
among living organisms from all sources including, inter 
alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and 
the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes 
diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems.’1
Biodiversity occurs at all levels - genetic, species, and ecosystem 
– and it is often best illustrated by considering the wide variety 
of plant, animal, and microorganism species that exist across the 
planet. To date, around 1.8 million different species have been 
discovered and documented, but this number only scratches the 
surface; estimates of the total number of species on earth and 
in the oceans range from 2 - 100 million, with a best working 
estimate of around 8 to 9 million different species alive on our 
planet (Vié et al., 2009).
UNDERSTANDING BIODIVERSITY, NATURAL CAPITAL 
AND ECOSYSTEMS SERVICES
In this publication we will refer to three concepts: natural 
capital, biodiversity and ecosystem services (ES). Since these 
terms are often used interchangeably (and incorrectly) they 
require explanation.
NATURAL CAPITAL 
In general terms, ‘capital’ is defined as the stock of materials or 
information that exists within a system at any given time 
(Costanza et al., 1997). Some common forms of capital are financial 
capital, man-made capital and social capital. The important 
concept within all forms of capital, however, is that when put to use 
they yield a flow of goods and/or services (Costanza and Daly, 
1992); much as an investor will use financial capital to generate 
profits, a stock of trees or population or fish will provide a future 
flow of timber or food. A final distinction to draw is the difference 
between living natural capital and dead natural capital. Living 
natural capital is sustained by solar energy, and includes all 
ecosystems. It can be harvested for goods and also yield ecosystem 
services when properly maintained. Dead natural capital includes 
1. The CBD uses the 
term biological diversity 
which for simplicity we 
will shorten to 
‘biodiversity’ throughout 
this publication.
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minerals and fossil fuels that do not provide any services other 
than their use, i.e. burning of fossil fuels for energy. For the 
purpose of this publication, natural capital will refer only to the 
stock of the earth’s living ecosystems.
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
Like man-made capital - such as a power station that provides 
electricity, or a water treatment facility that improves water 
quality - natural capital provides a vital flow of ecosystem goods 
and services. Ecosystem goods and services are functions of an 
ecosystem that directly or indirectly benefit human wellbeing 
(Daly and Farley, 2004, Voldoire and Royer, 2004) and play a vital 
role in livelihoods and economies from local to global scales 
(see page 18). 
Ecosystem goods are portions of the natural capital itself - such as 
timber or fish - that are harvested from ecosystems. It is well 
documented that overharvesting of ecosystem goods will lead to 
a depletion in natural capital and ultimately an unsustainable 
supply of both ecosystem goods and services (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Ecosystem services are flows of 
services such as watershed protection or climate regulation that 
can be derived from natural capital. Unlike ecosystem goods, the 
use of ecosystem services does not necessarily affect the 
sustainability of these services into the future. For simplicity and 
following standard terminology we will refer to both ecosystem 
goods and ecosystem services as ecosystem services throughout 
this publication.
BIODIVERSITY
The diversity of species within ecosystems is key to the provision 
of vital ecosystem services; much as a financial investor might 
diversify their portfolio of assets, it is also important to maintain 
the biodiversity of our natural capital. There is a consensus among 
ecologists that, in general, biologically diverse ecosystems provide 
a greater flow of ecosystem services than non-diverse systems 
(Hooper et al., 2005, Flombaum and Sala, 2008). There is also 
strong evidence that more biologically diverse ecosystems are 
more resilient to changing physical environments. In the face of 
the impending impacts of climate change it will be vital to 
maintain biologically diverse ecosystems to ensure the reliable 
provision of ecosystem services from the world’s stocks of 
natural capital. 
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THE FOREST ECO-UTILITY
Tropical forests contain over half of the 
world’s terrestrial biodiversity (The Royal 
Society, 2003) and act like a giant ‘eco-
utility’ providing vital ecosystem services 
that underpin climate, water, food and 
energy security as well as human health 
and livelihoods from local to global scales. 
Currently, these services are unrecognised 
and unrewarded in international policy and 
financial frameworks, causing tropical forests 
to be worth more dead than alive. We need to 
develop and implement policy and financial 
mechanisms that recognise and reward the 
value of the ecosystem services that forests 
provide. The wellbeing and resilience of 
societies and economies will depend on our 
ability and success in maintaining a healthy 
and resilient tropical forest eco-utility. 
CLIMATE SECURITY
Tropical rainforests have a double-cooling 
effect on the climate. Standing forests, 
without any intervention by man, sequester 
vast quantities of carbon dioxide (CO2) out 
of the atmosphere acting as a ‘carbon sink’. 
This service removes about 15% of human 
CO2 emissions from the atmosphere every 
year, equivalent to around 1 tonne of carbon 
dioxide (tCO2) per hectare per year (Lewis et 
al., 2009, IPCC, 2007). Instead of rewarding 
this service, however, we are destroying it: 
tropical deforestation, including peatland 
loss, accounts for around 15% of our global 
CO2 emissions (Van Der Werf et al., 2009) – 
more than the entire global transport sector 
combined – and reduces the ability of tropical 
forests to sequester CO2. Tropical forests also 
evaporate huge volumes of water that cool the 
earth’s surface and create clouds that reflect 
sunlight back out to space (Betts et al., 2007, 
Bonan, 2008). Besides helping us to mitigate 
the effects of climate change rainforests also 
increase our ability to adapt to its impacts. 
Climate change is likely to increase the 
frequency of extreme events such as droughts 
and floods. Forests can reduce the incidence 
of flood events at local scales by slowing down 
the passage of water over the land surface (van 
Dijk and Keenan, 2007). Forests also provide 
an essential buffer for local weather patterns 
since removing tree cover can result in greater 
extremes of temperature and rainfall thereby 
increasing the local impacts of climate change 
(Deo et al., 2009, Voldoire and Royer, 2004).
WATER SECURITY
Forests purify water and help to regulate water 
flows to downstream areas. Forests, especially 
forest soils, act like massive filters, purifying 
water as it drips through the forest ecosystem. 
This filtration service provides drinking water 
to over 60 million of the world’s population 
who dwell in tropical rainforests and to some 
of the world’s largest cities, at least one-third 
of which depend on forest protected areas for 
their water supply (Dudley and Stolton, 2003). 
The trunks and roots of forest ecosystems 
also act like a sponge, controlling the flow of 
surface and ground water into river systems, 
which helps to regulate cycles of flood and 
drought (Chivian, 2002). Furthermore, the 
recycling of water vapour by forests back into 
air currents helps to maintain rainfall regimes 
over vast areas. For example, much of the 
rainfall in the Andes that feeds glaciers and 
high-altitude populations has been recycled 
over lowland Amazonian forests (Poveda 
et al., 2008).
FOOD SECURITY
Forests underpin food production on local to 
global scales. Local communities and 
indigenous peoples have survived on food 
collected in tropical forests including wild 
meat, fruit and plants for thousands of years. 
For many rural populations tropical forests 
provide a fallback supply of food when 
personal, environmental, or economic crises 
occur. Small-scale farmers who clear land 
to grow food also depend on forests’ ability 
to recycle nutrients and prevent soil erosion. 
Many farmers also depend on forest insects 
such as bees to pollinate their crops (Ricketts 
et al., 2004) and as much as a third of fish 
caught each year in SE Asia depend on coastal 
mangrove forests (Hillel and Rosenzweig, 
2008). At regional and continental scales, 
forests help to recycle water vapour that falls 
as rain in agricultural areas far from the forest 
border. In Amazonia, winds carry moisture 
recycled by the forest in ‘flying rivers’ down 
to the south of Brazil and beyond, supporting 
agricultural production in the South American 
breadbasket (Vera et al., 2006, Marengo et 
al., 2004). 
ENERGY SECURITY
Tropical forests also support energy security 
at the local, regional and global levels. Local 
communities have sustainably used tropical 
forests as a source of fuel for cooking and 
heating for thousands of years. Presently, 
however, fuel wood collection is a major 
driver of deforestation, particularly in Africa 
and Southeast Asia (Griscom et al, 2009). 
Forests are also essential to the production 
of hydroelectricity through the regulation of 
water flow and the reduction of sedimentation 
in rivers at regional scales. For example, given 
that over two-thirds of Brazil’s electricity 
supply is generated through hydroelectricity, 
any changes in forest cover - which would in 
turn affect rainfall patterns, surface run-off 
and sedimentation of dams - would have a 
significant impact on the energy security of 
this hydropower-dependant country.
HEALTH SECURITY
As well as providing a sustainable source of 
fresh food and clean drinking water, forests 
are an essential source of wild-harvested 
medicines for both local communities and 
global pharmaceutical companies. Trade in 
medicines and plants derived from tropical 
rainforests is estimated to be around $108 
billion per year (Simula, 1999) – roughly equal 
to the amount spent on the UK’s National 
Health Service each year. Undisturbed tropical 
forests can also have a moderating effect 
on infectious diseases. 40% of the world’s 
population lives in malaria-infested regions 
and heavily deforested areas can see up to 
a 300-fold increase in the risk of malaria 
infection compared to areas of intact forest 
(Yasuoka and Levins, 2007). The commercial 
trade in bushmeat is also increasing human 
exposure to new diseases that are carried 
by wildlife and efforts to conserve areas of 
high biodiversity can reduce the likelihood of 
diseases such as SARS jumping from wildlife 
to humans (Jones et al., 2008). 
LIVELIHOOD SECURITY
More than a billion of the world’s poor depend 
on forests for some part of their livelihoods 
and food security and around 60 million 
indigenous people depend almost entirely on 
forests for their survival (World Bank, 2004). 
Tropical forests are one of the world’s richest 
sources of natural capital, providing raw 
materials such as timber and wild food as 
well as non-timber forest products (NTFPs) 
including rubber, oils and fibres that are 
economically important both locally and 
nationally in many tropical forest countries. 
Forest activities such as sustainable forest 
management (SFM) and eco-tourism also 
provide significant employment opportunities 
for rural populations.
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WHAT IS THE VALUE OF NATURAL CAPITAL?
 
Despite the importance of natural capital, humanity continues to 
destroy ecosystems at an alarming rate resulting in a substantial 
and largely irreversible loss in biodiversity (Sukhdev, 2008). 
Various estimates have been put forward for the value of natural 
capital and ecosystem services. Perhaps the most often quoted 
value is that put forward by Costanza et al. (1997), who estimated 
that the value of the world’s natural capital and ecosystem services 
was on average USD 33 trillion per year. Although this estimate 
was widely recognised (even by its critics) as an important catalyst 
for better understanding the value of nature, it received significant 
criticism for the approach and methods used (Toman, 1998; 
Pearce, 1998; Bockstael et al., 2000). Much of the criticism arose 
from the authors’ attempt to value the total global stock of 
natural capital.
More recently a study commissioned by the European Commission 
looked at the value of biodiversity loss due to not meeting the 2010 
biodiversity target (Braat and ten Brink, 2007). The study 
conservatively estimated that the loss of ecosystem services and 
biodiversity is valued at around EUR 550 billion per annum and if 
biodiversity continues to be lost at the projected rate, the 
accumulated cost of ecosystem services lost since 2000 could grow 
to EUR 14 trillion in the year 2050.
Whilst these studies highlight the enormous value of protecting 
natural capital (or the cost of losing it), neither provide an estimate 
for the cost of protecting natural capital. There have been relatively 
few studies over the years on the cost of protecting biodiversity and 
ecosystems services generally. Table 1 shows the range of estimates 
that have been put forward to protect natural capital over differing 
timescales and geographical scales.
Earlier estimates of the cost of protecting biodiversity focused on 
adequately financing the current global network of protected areas 
(PAs) and expanding it to be ecologically representative. Whilst 
adequate financing of PAs is a crucial component of a global 
biodiversity conservation strategy - particularly to protect the 
most rare and vulnerable ecosystems - natural capital cannot be 
conserved if conservation activities are confined to protected areas 
(IUCN, 2010). Many ecological and ecosystem processes occur 
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Table 1. Estimated 
annual costs of 
protecting natural capital 
(all values in USD billions 
per year)
2. PAs currently cover 
approximately 13.4% 
of terrestrial biomes and 
for marine biomes cover 
12.1% of coastal 
environments, 4.1% of 
shelf environments, 5.9% 
of territorial seas and 
0.5% of high seas {Coad, 
2009 #193}.
3. (Bruner et al., 2004)
4. (James et al., 2001)
5. (Balmford et al., 2002)
6. Equivalent to 0.3% 
of GDP based on 2010 
figures (IUCN, 2010)
7. (James et al., 2001)
8. (Berry, 2007)
9. Taken from an article 
by Juliette Jowit in the 
Guardian newspaper 
quoting Pavan Sukhdev 
(http://www.guardian.
co.uk/
environment/2010/
may/21/biodiversity-un-
report).
over scales far larger than that of PAs: many species are ill-suited 
to conservation in PAs and PAs are also vulnerable to edge effects 
and impending climate change (James et al., 2001). There is also a 
strong co-dependence between people’s wellbeing and the 
sustainable provision of ES that goes far beyond PAs; a wealth of 
research has demonstrated the dependence of society on 
ecosystem services that arise near and far from PAs, at the local, 
regional, and global scales (see page 18).
The cost of a fully comprehensive global conservation program - to 
sustainably manage agriculture, forests, freshwater, coastal and 
marine ecosystem - is difficult to precisely calculate, but has been 
estimated at around USD 290 billion per annum (IUCN, 2010, 
James et al., 2001). As a comparison, IUCN have called on OECD 
countries to provide an additional USD 120 billion per annum to 
finance biodiversity and the cost of halting deforestation in 
developing countries is in the range USD 25 - 185 billion per 
annum (Parker et al., 2009, UNFCCC, 2007). 
Clearly, the cost of protecting natural capital is in the order of 
hundreds of billions of dollars annually. Although a significant 
portion of that cost may be funded through the private sector 
through the sustainable supply of ecosystems good and services 
(Gutman and Davidson, 2008) it will certainly require strong 
policy and public sector support to realise this level of funding. 
Whilst these costs seem high, the costs of inaction are far greater; 
if we continue to destroy biodiversity and ecosystems at the 
current rate we will lose ecosystems services worth 10-100 times 
the cost of protecting them9.
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TARGET2 
15% of all terrestrial PAs
15% of all terrestrial ecosystems
15% of all terrestrial ecosystems 
and 30% of all marine ecosystems 
Conservation of majority of world’s 
biodiversity
Maintain biodiversity in the 
human-dominated environment
In the context of climate change
TIMEFRAME
(YR)
10 
30 
30 
-
-
-
SCALE 
(USD BN/YR)
4-13 
18-27.5
45
120 
290
355-385
ACTION
Expand PA network3
Expand PA network4
Expand PA network5
Global biodiversity 
protection6 
Protect all biodiversity 
outside protected areas7
Total ecosystem protection8
THE CURRENT SCALE OF FINANCING: MIND THE GAP
Whilst there is clearly a need for large-scale financing for 
biodiversity in both developed and developing countries, the 
current scale of funding for biodiversity falls well below these 
targets. Globally, the current level of financing for biodiversity 
and ES is between USD 36-38 billion annually, with less than 
half of this (USD 15-16 billion) being spent in developing 
countries (see Table 2). 
Whilst these values are larger than recent estimates, the 
current scale of finance for ecosystem services and biodiversity is 
still an order of magnitude lower than the amount that is required 
to conserve biodiversity and ecosystems globally (see Table 1). 
In addition, the majority of finance (~USD 29 billion) is being 
delivered through traditional non-market mechanisms, 
with considerable room to scale up the use of innovative 
financial mechanisms.
The majority of the world’s biodiversity lies in developing countries 
(see Figure 1 and Figure 2) and as their populations are more 
directly dependent on ecosystem services for their well-being and 
livelihood, as ecosystem finance increases, a much larger 
percentage of it needs to be spent in these countries. Whilst more 
research is needed on the scale of finance needed to adequately 
protect ecosystems and biodiversity, as an indication as much as 
90% of the expansion of protected areas needs to take place in 
developing countries (James et al., 2001).
Funding for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries (REDD) will continue to 
provide a boost to conservation funding in developing countries, 
but is primarily focused on carbon mitigation and sequestration 
rather than ecosystem services or natural capital more generally 
(see page 63). Realisation and commitments for REDD funding 
prior to the Copenhagen climate conference were around USD4.1 
billion (Parker et al., 2009) with a resulting pledge emerging from 
the conference of ~ USD 4 billion over the period 2010 - 2012 . 
These figures are also far below the scale of funding required over 
this period, which is estimated to be between USD 17-33 billion 
(IWG-IFR, 2009).
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10. Hamilton et al., 2010
11. Based on Stanton et 
al., 2010
12. Madsen et al., 2010
13. Authors’ estimations
14. See http://www.tpl.
org/landvote
15. Based on Walls, 2009 
,James, 1999, Stanton et 
al., 2010; Adelle, 2009
16. Based on Gutman and 
Davidson, 2008; CBD, 
2010
17. Based on Castro and 
Hammond, 2009; US 
AID, 2009; CBD, 2010
18. Likely an 
overestimate as it 
encompasses all 
“biodiversity-related” aid
19. Sobrevila, 2010
20. Average annual 
amount allocated for 
biodiversity focal area 
1991-2004.
21. From Steckhan, 2009
22. Based on Gutman 
and Davidson, 2008; 
CBD, 2010.
22. Taken from http://
www.oslocfc2010.no/
  Generated  Delivered
  Developed Developing Developed Developing Year 
Direct 
Forest carbon10 0.150  0.08 0.07 2009  
Private PWS11  0.8  0.8 2008  
Biodiversity offsets12 1.50-2.5 0.4 1.50-2.5 0.4 - 
Auctioning of allowances13 0.1   0.1 - 
Subtotal  1.75-2.75 1.2 1.58-2.58 1.37
Linked
User fees14  0.75 0.25 0.5 0.5 -
Green commodities14 2  1 1 2008 
Bio-prospecting14 0.005   0.005 - 
Bonds (US only)15  1.2  1.2  1990-2009
Subtotal   3.96 0.5 2.7 1.51  
Non- Market
Domestic government 
spending16   15.78 8.38 15.78 8.38 - 
Bilateral and EC aid17  3.4   3.418  1998-2007  
World Bank Group19 0.155   0.155 1988-2009 
GEF20   0.135   0.135 1991-2004  
UNDP (non-GEF funds21) 0.022   0.022 2004-2007
Philanthropy17 1-2  0.5-1 0.5-1 - 
Subtotal   20.5-21.5 8.4 16.3-16.8 12.6-13.1  
 
Total  26.2-28.2 9.9 20.6-22.1 15.5-16  
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Table 2. Current flows 
finance for ecosystem 
services and biodiversity 
in developed and 
developing countries (all 
values in USD billions 
per year)
WHAT ARE PAYMENTS FOR 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (PES)?
The basic idea behind payments for ecosystem 
services (PES) is that those who provide 
ecosystem services should be compensated 
for the cost of doing so. In contrast, the 
current economic system only rewards the 
conversion of ecosystems for alternative land 
uses, thereby reducing the flow of valuable 
services these ecosystems provide. Payments 
for ecosystems services were developed to 
incentivize land users to properly manage 
and conserve their natural environment thus 
ensuring the flow of ecosystem services 
(Pagiola and Platais, 2002).
TRADITIONAL PES
PES were defined by Wunder (2005) as: 
A voluntary transaction where a well-defined 
ES is being bought by an ES buyer from an 
ES provider if and only if the ES provider 
secures ES provision (conditionality). 
In reality, however, a true PES scheme 
is hard to find (Muradian et al., 2009); 
regulatory (as opposed to voluntary) 
conservation policies are being more 
commonly considered as PES, and 
payments for biodiversity or ecosystem 
services are no longer limited to purely 
direct financial incentives, but can be 
indirect or non-financial incentives. 
Furthermore, ecosystem services are often 
not well defined; conservation of habitat 
is considered a proxy for ecosystem 
services provision and there is often little 
differentiation between payments for ES 
and payments for biodiversity.
REDEFINING PES
With such a rapid proliferation of PES and 
PES-like schemes over the past 10-15 
years, the term “PES” has been 
stretched to suit various purposes. It is 
now often used to describe markets, rather 
than payments for ecosystem services, 
or for programmes that place more focus 
on social, rather than environmental, 
outcomes. New definitions of PES have 
therefore emerged to match theory to 
practice (Pascual et al., 2010). The general 
re-conceptualisation of PES recognises the 
reality that PES schemes are often used as 
policy tools with multiple objectives, and 
implies an alternative conceptual framework 
for PES as a type of common-pool resource 
management regime. In this case, PES are 
not a single type of policy, but a spectrum 
of arrangements with varying degrees of 
commodification of ecosystem services, 
differing importance of financial incentives, 
and a range of indirect and direct transfers 
of incentives (Muradian et al., 2010).
PES IN THE LITTLE BIODIVERSITY FINANCE BOOK
No matter how PES are defined, it is 
important to understand how PES will 
operate as a financial mechanism for 
biodiversity conservation and ecosystem 
service provision. PES schemes - as with all 
financial mechanisms - will require a way 
to generate revenue, a form of institutional 
arrangement to transfer and manage these 
funds and a mechanism to deliver finance 
(see Figure 3). The term ‘PES’, however, 
is often used to describe all three parts 
of a financing mechanism, when it more 
precisely refers to the payment or incentive 
used as a delivery mechanism. For example, 
Costa Rica’s national programme generated 
revenue from a variety of mechanisms 
including a tax, managed funds through a 
central national institution, and delivered 
finance through conditional, financial 
incentives. The national programme 
incorporates all three components, but the 
actual payments for ecosystem services are 
only the final, delivery component of this 
overall process.
For simplicity, this book uses the term 
PES sparingly. Under the revenue 
generation section, ‘PES’ refers to 
mechanisms that hold closest to the 
traditional definition of PES as money 
that is raised as a direct payment for an 
ecosystem service (‘Direct PES’). Other 
revenue generating mechanisms typically 
referred to as PES are also summarized, 
but have not been categorized as PES 
(see Table 3). Under the delivery section 
PES refers to any mechanism that uses a 
positive, conditional incentive, including 
for example, non-financial incentives or 
conditional microcredit.
Table 3. Different types of revenue generation mechanism classified by payer and service.
BENEFICIARY PAYS
DIRECT PES
Beneficiary pays for ES that flow to them. ES 
are not wholly public, but can be captured to 
some degree by paying beneficiaries.
Bilateral arrangement
e.g. Payments for watershed services
USER FEES
Beneficiary pays for access to/use of in situ 
BD. Direct use BD benefits accrue to those 
who pay for access.
Single payments
e.g. Eco-tourism, hunting licenses
POLLUTER PAYS
ES MARKETS
Polluter pays for damage they have done 
by buying an offset/credit. The beneficiaries 
are the population that receive the ES and 
are usually different from the population 
that is paying. 
Bilateral/Market arrangement 
e.g. Water quality trading, forest carbon
BIODIVERSITY MARKETS
Polluter pays for damage they have done to 
biodiversity by buying an offset/credit.
The beneficiaries are the population that 
enjoy BD as a public good.
Bilateral/Market arrangement e.g. BD 
offsets/banks, tradable fisheries quotas
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Figure 3. The financial 
mechanism of Payments 
for Ecosystem Services 
adapted from (Pagiola 
and Platais, 2002).
Figure 1. Spatial 
concordance of global 
biodiversity priorities 
and ecosystem service 
value (ESV). Increasing 
intensities of green and 
red represent, 
respectively, increasing 
rank ESV and increasing 
rank consensus 
biodiversity priority. 
White corresponds to low 
values for both variables, 
black to high values for 
both, and shades of gray 
to covarying values for 
both. Source: Turner et 
al. (2007). Reproduced 
courtesy of BioScience.
Figure 2. Relative 
species richness for 
amphibians and 
mammals, calculated 
from individual species 
distribution maps 
for mammals and 
amphibians. Source 
(Mulligan, 2010)
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24. tated in the preamble 
to the Convention 
(http://www.cbd.int/
convention/articles.
shtml?a=cbd-00). 
25. From Article 20 of 
the Convention (http://
www.cbd.int/
convention/articles.
shtml?a=cbd-20)
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THE STORY SO FAR...
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is a global, legally 
binding treaty for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity. The CBD was established in 1992 at the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the 
‘Earth Summit’ held in Rio de Janeiro. The CBD is one of the three 
“Rio Conventions” along with the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the UN Convention to Combat 
Desertification (UNCCD). 
The CBD came into force at the end of 1993, and has three 
main objectives: 
 • The conservation of biodiversity, 
 • The sustainable use of its components, and 
 • The fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the 
    utilization of genetic resources.
With regards to finance the Convention acknowledges that:
“the provision of new and additional financial resources and 
appropriate access to relevant technologies can be expected to 
make a substantial difference in the world‘s ability to address the 
loss of biological diversity” 
and that 
“special provision is required to meet the needs of 
developing countries” 24.
Article 20 of the Convention specifically requests each Party to:
“provide, in accordance with its capabilities, financial support 
and incentives in respect of those national activities which are 
intended to achieve the objectives of this Convention, in 
accordance with its national plans, priorities and programmes”
And developed country Parties are also required to:
“provide new and additional financial resources to enable 
developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental 
costs to them of implementing measures which fulfil the 
obligations of this Convention”25 .
Since the Convention entered into force, its Conference of the 
Parties (COP) has expressed in a multitude of decisions the urgent 
need for adequate financing for biodiversity. At COP 9 in Bonn in 
2008, the Parties reviewed the availability of financial resources 
and expressed concern that the lack of resources continued to be 
one of the main obstacles to achieving the Convention’s objectives 
as well as realising the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). At 
the same meeting, the Parties provided guidance to the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), the Convention’s sole financial 
mechanism, adopting a four-year outcome-oriented framework of 
programme priorities related to the utilization of GEF funds for the 
fifth replenishment period 2011-201426. At COP 9 the Parties also 
adopted a strategy for resource mobilisation to significantly 
enhance international financial flows and domestic funding for 
biological diversity with the goal of achieving a substantial 
reduction in the current funding gaps for biodiversity27. The 
strategy for resource mobilisation contained the specific goal of 
exploring “new and innovative financial mechanisms at all levels 
with a view to increasing funding to support the three objectives 
of the Convention”28 . 
In support of the strategy for resource mobilization, COP 10 is 
expected to encourage Parties to implement the strategy for 
resource mobilisation at the national level and to take an active 
part in ongoing processes to enhance innovative financial 
mechanisms for biodiversity. COP 10 will also engage Parties in a 
global discussion on the need and possible modalities of innovative 
financing mechanisms for biodiversity and ES.
26. The four year 
programme of the GEF 
was adopted in Decision 
IX/31
27. The strategy for 
resource mobilization is 
annexed to decision IX/11 
(http://www.cbd.int/
decision/cop/?id=11654).
28. Goal 4 of Decision 
IX/11.
THE 
OVERARCHING 
FRAMEWORK
THE BUILDING BLOCKS
In order to better understand innovative financial mechanisms for 
biological diversity and ecosystems services, we present here a 
framework comprised of three basic modules16:
Generation (How is finance raised?)
Delivery (How is finance delivered?)
Institutional Arrangements (How are decisions made?)
Individually, these modules represent a discrete area of the 
financial system and when combined they describe the overall 
framework for how a financial mechanism might work. 
MIX AND MATCH OPTIONS
This book is accordingly divided into three sections to correspond 
with the three modules shown above. Each section will provide an 
analysis and summary of the various options that exist to under 
these three modules.
The proposals presented within one module potentially impose 
constraints on options in other modules. For example, the use of 
a market mechanism under revenue generation would be 
incompatible with a grant for delivery of finance. When viewing 
the proposals as a group, however, there are a number of different 
‘mix and match’ options; for example, the decision to use the 
auctioning of allowances to generate revenue can, broadly 
speaking, be addressed separately from the question of whether 
to use grants or concessional loans to deliver finance.
10. Developed in 
conjunction with the 
Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI), Oxford 
Institute for Energy 
Studies (OIES and the 
Australian National 
University (ANU) for the 
Little Climate Finance 
Book (2009)
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To provide a quick reference to the different modules of the 
framework, the colours for the three modules shown above are 
used throughout this guide, green will always signify generation, 
blue: delivery and brown: institutional arrangements.
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Figure 4. Building 
blocks of a financial 
mechanism
INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS
HOW ARE DECISIONS MADE? 
 
THROUGH WHAT 
PROCESSES?
HOW IS FINANCE RAISED? 
 
THROUGH WHAT 
MECHANISMS? 
 
WHO WILL CONTRIBUTE?
GENERATION DELIVERY
HOW IS FINANCE DELIVERED?
THROUGH WHAT 
MECHANISMS?
WHICH COUNTRIES WILL 
BENEFIT?
WHICH ACTIVITIES WILL  
BE REWARDED?
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UNDERSTANDING GENERATION
The first chapter of this publication examines the range of options 
that have been put forward to generate finance for biodiversity and 
ecosystem services.
THE STATE OF PLAY
The majority of biodiversity and ecosystem finance is currently 
being generated through traditional sources of finance including 
government budget allocations, official development assistance 
(ODA) and philanthropy. 
The current scale of finance is insufficient to meet the hundreds of 
billions of dollars needed for biodiversity conservation worldwide. 
There is therefore an urgent need for the international community 
to develop new and innovative sources of finance to address the 
‘gap’ in national and international biodiversity financing.
A BRIEF HISTORY
The Convention on Biological Diversity lays out clear 
responsibilities for developed countries to provide financial 
resources for the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity and the equitable sharing of benefits arising from its use.
Article(s) 8(m) and 9(e) of the Convention state that: 
“8: Each contracting Party shall, as far as possible and 
appropriate (...), (m) Cooperate in providing financial and 
other support for in-situ conservation (…), particularly to 
developing countries.”
“9: Each Contracting Party shall (…), (e) Cooperate in providing 
financial and other support for ex-situ conservation (…) and in the 
establishment and maintenance of ex-situ conservation facilities 
in developing countries.”
And Article 20(2) states:
“20(2): The developed country Parties shall provide new and 
additional financial resources to enable developing country 
Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of 
implementing measures which fulfill the obligations of this 
Convention and to benefit from its provisions and which costs are 
agreed between the developing country Party and [the GEF]. 
1. The adaptation 
fund generates finance 
through a levy on the 
issuance of Certified 
Emissions Reductions. 
 
2. Foreign direct 
investment and  
domestic finance also 
provide significant 
sources of finance but  
are considered outside  
of the commitments 
required by developed 
countries under  
the Convention  
and are therefore not 
discussed here.
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GENERATION FRAMEWORK 
 
CRITERIA
The diagram below presents a framework to analyse and 
understand the different mechanisms that can be used for revenue 
generation. The framework comprises six revenue generation 
criteria as follows:
Scale: How much money will be raised?
Timeframe: Over what period?
Level: At what level is finance aggregated? 
Market: Through what type of mechanism? 
Contributor: Who will pay? Who should pay?
Value: Why will they pay?
Using these criteria allows us to compare individual mechanisms 
and to collectively see areas of convergence and divergence. The 
following pages provide an explanation of these criteria and show 
how they can be used to understand mechanisms for revenue 
generation. The criteria are based in part on the requirements set 
by the CBD in relation to the provision of financial resources. 
Article 20 (2) refers to the need for financial resources to be 
adequate, predictable and timely.
The proposals for revenue generation are accordingly  
presented in two sections: ‘Contribution Frameworks’ presents 
proposals that address the purely normative issue of ‘who  
should pay’ and ‘Generation Mechanisms’ presents proposals  
that are primarily mechanistic but nonetheless have  
distributive implications.
The following pages provide an explanation of these  
criteria in relation to the principles outlined above and show  
how these criteria can be used to understand proposals for  
revenue generation.
Figure 5. A framework 
for understanding 
revenue generation 
proposals
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ADEQUATE
SCALE
How much money  
will be raised?
PRINCIPLE 
CRITERION 
PREDICTABLE
LEVEL
Is finance raised 
through the private 
sector, national 
governments 
or international 
governmental 
organisation? 
SOURCE
From where will 
money be generated?
TIMELY
TIMEFRAME
Over what period?
GENERATION
SCALE
The first step in understanding revenue generation options is to 
know how much money could be raised by a given mechanism. 
The scale shown for each proposal is an estimate (in billions of 
USD) of how much revenue the mechanism could generate on an 
annual basis.
Options: Numeric Value in billions of USD 
 
An essential requirement of any revenue generation mechanism 
is its ability to deliver adequate financing for biodiversity and 
ecosystem services conservation. Whilst no single mechanism is 
likely to generate adequate finance to meet the billions of USD 
required to finance biodiversity, it is nonetheless important 
to understand how much finance a given mechanism might 
contribute.
The question of how much finance will be raised is closely 
related to when that money will become available and how 
predictable the source of finance will be. These questions will be 
addressed further in the timeframe and level components of 
this framework respectively.
The scale criterion will use a numeric value (in billions of USD) 
representing annual flows of finance by 2020. The scale will either 
be a single number (indicating the best estimate of finance in 
2020), or a range from a low end estimate (which assumes 
some policy intervention) to a high end value (with significant 
policy intervention).
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220-440
USD bn
SHORT MEDIUM LONG 
TERM TERM  TERMTIMEFRAME
The timeframe describes the period when financing from a 
mechanism is likely to be available.
Options: Short-term (<2012), Medium-term (2012-2020), 
Long-term (>2020)
Another key component for revenue generation is that finance for 
biodiversity and ES is made available in a timely manner. Financial 
resources can be generated in either the short-, medium- or the 
long-term, defined here as up to 2012, between 2012 and 2020 and 
after 2020 respectively. 
Certain activities such as capacity building and demonstration 
projects will require finance in the short term, whereas other 
actions such as the implementation of a fully integrated 
biodiversity market will take longer to achieve.
As discussed under the scale criterion, it is unlikely that any one 
mechanism proposed here would be sufficient to deliver the scale 
of financing required across all three timeframes. It will be 
essential though, that financial sources and timeframes are 
matched to delivery needs so that adequate financing is available in 
a timely manner for developing countries to act on biodiversity and 
ecosystem conservation.
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LEVEL
The level criterion describes whether revenue will be generated by 
a mechanism that is implemented by the private sector or by the 
public sector either nationally or internationally.
Options: Private, National Public, International Public
Broadly speaking revenue generation mechanisms can be 
implemented by a private organisation by a public body (including 
local and national governments) or by a public body at the 
international level. The level at which revenue is generated will 
have important implications for both the adequacy and 
predictability of ecosystem finance.
Private finance is defined here as revenue that is generated 
through a mechanism implemented in the private sector1. Private 
finance can use voluntary mechanisms (see e.g. green commodities 
on page 71 or direct PES schemes on page 64) or can be driven by 
national or international policy regulation (see page 67 or page 62). 
The key to private finance is that the finance raised does not enter 
the hands of the public sector.
Public sector finance is similarly defined as revenue that is 
generated through a mechanism controlled by a public body and 
can be divided into national and international sources of finance. 
National level mechanisms raise finance that is initially 
generated by local or national governments, and include general 
taxes, natural capital taxes (see page 72), and more innovative 
sources of finance such as bonds (see page 77). International 
mechanisms raise finance that is initially generated at a 
supranational level and include a financial transaction tax (see 
page 82) and debt-for-nature swaps (see page 58).
Revenue generated at the national level is often considered to be an 
unpredictable source of international finance due to the domestic 
revenue problem (see page 46). Whilst revenue generation at the 
international-level is, in theory, a simple solution to this issue, it 
faces political challenges, as contributing countries have 
historically preferred to maintain visibility and control over their 
contribution to international finance.
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ADDITIONALITY OF 
BIODIVERSITY FINANCE
A key requirement for biodiversity and 
ecosystem finance is that revenue is ‘new and 
‘additional’. Whilst this term is central to the 
consideration of revenue generation it is often 
poorly defined and use symbolically within 
finance discussions. The main concern is that 
finance for biodiversity does not displace public 
funds that are otherwise intended for long-term 
commitments such as the support of 
development and climate change in poor 
countries (see page 76). As such a useful 
departure point is to define additionality in 
meaningful language that addresses the 
concerns of the development community 
{Brown, 2001 #200}.
ADDITIONAL TO THE 0.7% ODA TARGET
The first definition of additionality is that 
finance is additional to the 0.7% ODA target.  
This approach would be relatively 
straightforward to implement and would be 
supported by the development and climate 
community as it would not divert existing funds 
away from this goal. Politically this would be 
less acceptable to many donor countries as 
they are already not meeting their aid targets.
ADDITIONAL TO HISTORICAL ODA LEVELS
This second definition would set a reference 
level as a base year for ODA spending (e.g. 
2010) and finance above this amount would be 
counted as additional. This approach would be 
less straightforward to implement as existing 
data on ODA is at best imprecise and it could 
potentially divert significant flows of finance 
from the 0.7% target for aid. It would also be 
more advantageous to countries that have not 
yet met their ODA commitment and is 
therefore unlikely to be politically acceptable 
for both donor countries and the 
development community.
ADDITIONAL TO HISTORICAL ODA BUT CAPPED
A further option building on the previous 
definition would be to only allow a percentage 
of future ODA commitments to be met through 
ecosystem finance. This approach would limit 
the amount of aid finance that could be 
diverted through new ecosystem commitments 
thereby addressing some of the development 
concerns of definition 2, but it would still favour 
countries that have historically not met their 
ODA commitments. This would also be 
politically challenging to implement as it would 
be difficult to choose an appropriate 
percentage for the cap.
ADDITIONAL TO HISTORICAL 
ECOSYSTEM FINANCE
This option would use a similar approach as 
definition 2 but would treat ecosystem finance 
as additional only if it is above previous 
spending on biodiversity.  The key to this 
approach is that biodiversity finance could not 
be used towards ODA, i.e. there would be a 
decoupling of accounting between these two 
agendas. Technically this would be the most 
challenging option to implement as it would 
require new accounting and tracking systems. 
In addition, ecosystem and development 
finance have significant overlaps that need to 
be harnessed where possible. 
Based on (Brown et al., 2010)
1. Whilst other 
mechanisms might 
generate revenue from 
the private sector 
(i.e. a tax on aviation) if 
this revenue is generated 
through a national or 
international policy then 
this is considered 
public finance.
NATIONALPRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL
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REVENUE CAPTURE AND THE 
DOMESTIC REVENUE PROBLEM
Ecosystem finance faces two key challenges 
when revenue is raised through national 
government mechanisms. The first is often 
referred to as revenue capture, which occurs 
when national governments use revenue that is 
generated from ecosystem finance mechanisms 
for other policy priorities.
Development agencies and national 
governments have traditionally discouraged 
earmarking government revenues because it 
reduces flexibility in the use of domestic 
revenue. Whilst this argument is relevant for 
general taxes and levies that indiscriminately 
raise finance (as discussed under the “payer” 
criterion, see page 48), it is less applicable to 
mechanisms that are directly linked to 
ecosystem use; earmarking revenues raised 
through environmental mechanisms for 
environmental purposes can have significant 
political and economic advantages (OECD 
2005). For example, polluter-pays 
mechanisms, such as a natural capital tax (see 
65) or the national auctioning of allowances 
(see 64), can receive increased political and 
public acceptance if they are being used 
explicitly to finance sustainable development 
activities. Similarly revenue generated through 
beneficiary-pays mechanisms such as direct 
PES (see 58) should be used to ensure the 
continued provision of those ecosystem 
services being paid for.
The second issue for ecosystem finance is a 
variation of political capture known as the 
domestic revenue problem. The domestic 
revenue problem arises when money that is 
intended for international purposes enters 
national-level budgets. Due largely to the 
competing concerns of other national interests, 
domestic revenue is less likely to be transferred 
to international causes as it is seen to be 
nationally owned (Doornbosch and Knight 
2008; Müller 2008). Although governments 
can set aside revenue that is generated 
nationally for international purposes, this 
funding is still unpredictable as both national 
policies and national circumstances 
can change.
A potential solution to these problems is to use 
off-budget funding streams (Müller and 
Gomez-Echeverri 2009). Keeping revenue that 
is intended for public use off-budget makes it 
relatively simple later on for governments to 
disburse this revenue for its intended use. 
Another partial solution to the issue of political 
capture is to implement mechanisms through 
the private sector or intergovernmental 
organisations. Since these financing streams 
are outside the direct hands of national 
governments they are also less likely to be 
re-appropriated. Government action is still 
required, however, to ensure that private-sector 
mechanisms are effective (e.g. certification 
standards for green commodities) and 
international mechanisms must consider other 
pressing international issues in the allocation of 
their finance (see page 79).
MARKET
The market criterion refers to the type of market that the 
mechanism uses to generate revenue.
Options: Direct, Linked, Other, Non-market
Revenue generation mechanisms can broadly be grouped into four 
categories as shown above. These groups have been chosen due to 
their varying implications for the predictability and adequacy of 
revenue streams for biodiversity and ecosystem services finance.
Direct mechanisms generate finance directly from the provision 
of an ecosystem service or biodiversity. These mechanisms are 
currently, typically national or subnational in scale and are 
voluntary private sector mechanisms2 such as direct PES schemes 
(see page 64) and baseline-and-credit markets (see page 68)3.
Linked mechanisms raise finance by tangibly linking the value of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services to more traditional markets, 
creating indirect markets for ecosystem services (MES). For 
example green commodities (see page 71) capture consumer 
demand for ES and biodiversity through international markets for 
commodities such as coffee or tea. Given the scale of the traditional 
markets in which they operate, linked mechanisms have the 
potential to raise significant levels of finance for biodiversity.
Mechanisms categorised as other market do not make such a 
tangible link to biodiversity and ecosystem services. These 
options, discussed on pages 80-83, whilst having the potential to 
raise adequate sources of finance for biodiversity and ES are 
generally considered to be less politically feasible to implement 
than direct or indirect options, and since these markets fall outside 
of the mandate of the CBD, allocation of resources from these 
mechanisms would have to compete with other sectors.
Finally the non-market option includes mechanisms that 
generate revenue from non-market sources of finance (e.g. ODA 
and Philanthropy discussed on pages 57 and 58). The predictability 
of these mechanisms is more variable than the other options as 
they are not related to a traditional market and are often subject to 
the changing political climate.
DIRECT
OTHER
LINKED
NON-MARKET
2. See above under the 
level criteria for a more 
detailed description of 
voluntary private sector 
sources of finance. 
3. Whilst direct 
mechanisms are 
currently limited in scale 
due to the voluntary 
nature of these markets, 
these mechanisms might 
be scaled up if a 
compliance regime could 
be established to pay 
directly for ecosystems.
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PAYER
The payer criterion indicates whether finance is generated from the 
beneficiary of biodiversity and ecosystems services or the polluter 
that degrades them.
Options: Polluter, Beneficiary, Indiscriminate
Ecosystem finance mechanisms have traditionally been grouped 
under two categories: polluter-pays or beneficiary-pays. 
Mechanisms that impose a payment on the polluter are deemed 
to follow the ‘polluter-pays principle’. The basic idea behind this 
principle is that the price of a man-made good or service should 
fully reflect the total cost of production, including any costs borne 
from degrading the natural environment. A farmer that uses 
hazardous chemicals switching to a less environmentally 
damaging practice, or an organisation paying to offset the loss of 
biodiversity caused by building their new manufacturing plant (see 
page 68) are both examples of polluter-pays mechanisms. 
Traditionally polluter pays mechanisms have followed some form 
of governmental or international regulation (Pearce, 2004). Many 
innovative financing options are now emerging, however, that fall 
under voluntary arrangements driven either by increased 
consumer awareness, corporate social responsibility (CSR) or risk 
mitigation strategies.
The other category of mechanism under this criterion is 
‘beneficiary pays’ in which revenue is generated from the 
beneficiary of biodiversity or ecosystem services. Examples of 
beneficiary pays mechanisms are Direct PES mechanisms (see 
page 64), which are traditionally local arrangements whereby 
downstream land users pay upstream land users not to pollute, or 
global arrangement in which developed countries pay poorer 
countries to adopt more environmentally friendly technologies 
(Pearce, 2004).
If the polluter and the payer icons are both greyed out this 
indicates that a mechanism raises finance indiscriminately 
from polluters and beneficiaries. For example, a financial 
transaction tax (page 82) would raise finance from any financial 
transaction irrespective of the motivation behind it.
VALUE
The value criterion indicates whether finance is generated for the 
use of biodiversity and ecosystem services or for some other (non-
use) reason.
Options: Use, Non-use
Biodiversity and ecosystem services are valuable to many people 
for many reasons (see for example page 18 on the forest eco-
utility). For reasons of quantification and understanding, these 
values are often classified in terms of use or non-use values (see 
Figure 6).
Mechanisms based on use values raise finance from actors that 
will directly use the ecosystem they are paying for, e.g. direct 
PES (see page 64), or as compensation for the degradation of an 
ecosystem, such as baseline-and-credit markets (see page 69). 
Mechanisms based on non-use values raise finance primarily 
from motivations that are not derived from the use of an 
ecosystem, e.g. philanthropy (see page 62). In reality finance will 
have a mix of motivating reasons, but mechanisms are categorised 
here based on the primary motivation.
If the use and the non-use icons are both greyed out this indicates 
that given mechanism, it is indiscriminate as to whether 
finance is raised based on use or non-use values. Again, a financial 
transaction tax (see page 82) provides a good example since it 
would raise finance from any currency transaction irrespective of 
the motivation behind it.
BENEFICIARYPOLLUTER USE NON-USE
Figure 6. Simplified 
breakdown of total 
economic value of 
ecosystems into use and 
non-use values using the 
example of tropical 
forests adapted from 
(Smith et al., 2006)
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A GUIDE TO REVENUE GENERATION PROPOSALS
The following pages present a guide to 18 mechanisms to generate 
finance for biodiversity and ecosystem services using a common 
framework. Whilst other studies have presented a broader array 
of mechanisms than those presented here4, these often include 
entries that can be consolidated into a single mechanism (e.g. all 
voluntary, altruistic sources can be classified as philanthropy). 
Finally, we have only represented mechanisms here that are 
generally accepted to be politically feasible within the context 
of environmental conservation.
Each mechanisms is analysed using the framework presented 
above and is represented graphically using the icons shown 
overleaf. These icons represent the main options from the 
analytical framework, and have been grouped into their 
respective criteria.
The icons will be presented to the side of each proposal in an ‘icon 
bar’ shown here on the left. Not all proposals aim to define all of the 
criteria of the framework. To simplify matters, all icons in the icon 
bar will be greyed out by default and only the options that are 
explicitly proposed in the submissions will be highlighted 
in colour5. 
For example the ‘icon bar’ shown on the left indicates that the scale 
of this hypothetical mechanism is USD 20 - 30 billion per year, the 
time frame is in the short- and medium-term and the finance is 
raised at the international level through a through a beneficiary-
pays, non-use, other market.
For easier reference, the mechanisms presented here have been 
grouped by source. Non market (i.e. more traditional) sources 
of finance are presented first, followed by direct market, linked 
market, and other market mechanisms. This order follows the 
current scale of finance for biodiversity and ES.
TIMEFRAME
SCALE
20–30
USD bn
MARKET
PAYER
VALUE
LEVEL
4. See e.g. Gutman and 
Davidson, 2010 and 
reviews cited therein,
5. See notes above for 
Payer and Value
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DOMESTIC BUDGET ALLOCATION
Currently, the largest source of finance for biodiversity and 
ecosystems is domestic government spending (see Table 2). 
Finance raised from domestic budget allocation is the contribution 
of national (and local) governments to domestic biodiversity 
conservation and ecosystem services provision. It is important 
to note that whilst many of the other innovative mechanisms 
discussed here could be used domestically, this mechanism 
refers specifically to the allocation of finance from general 
government budgets.
Whilst the global total of domestic spending on biodiversity has 
risen over recent years that rise is seemingly based on only a few 
large programmes in the US, EU and China. In most of the world, 
domestic spending on environment protection remains flat (CBD, 
2010a) and further increasing the allocation of national and 
subnational budgets to biodiversity and ecosystem services faces 
the hurdle of being in competition with other domestic interests 
including energy security and health (see page 46). As discussed 
in the introduction, however, biodiversity and ecosystem services 
play a vital role from local to global scales in underpinning 
national and regional economies and livelihoods. It is therefore 
in the interest of national and local governments to preserve their 
natural capital, and governments will therefore often seek to raise 
domestic revenue to finance biodiversity and ES.
The current scale of domestic finance is around USD 24 billion6 per 
annum, about two-thirds of which is spent in developed countries. 
Traditionally finance from domestic budget allocations was 
delivered to protected areas. More recently, however, there has 
been an increase in payments for agri-environmental schemes, 
such as the European Union Common Agricultural Policy or 
China’s Grain for Green, and government-funded payments for 
watershed services.
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7. The delivery of ODA 
must be concessional in 
character and convey a 
grant element of at least 
25% (OECD, 2008). 
8. Commitments 
expected to be met were 
ex-ante estimated to be 
USD 126 billion in 2010 
expressed in 2009 
dollars, which after 
applying global average 
inflation (IMF< 2010) is 
USD 130.6 billion
9. Based on data from 
Castro and Hammond, 
2009, Sobrevila, 2010 
and Steckhan, 2009
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is voluntary finance given 
by national governments to developing countries to promote and 
implement development7. By definition, therefore, ODA is not a 
source of finance for biodiversity and ecosystems services but due 
to the large overlap between environmental and developmental 
goals, aid is often seen as a way to deliver finance for the 
environment. As with domestic budget allocation (see page 56) 
ODA refers only to the contribution of domestic budgets to 
international flows of overseas aid. Many of the national-level 
mechanisms outlined below might be implemented in OECD 
countries and once raised the revenue could be delivered in 
developing countries and accounted for under ODA commitments. 
Careful accounting is required to ensure that finance raised 
through innovative mechanisms is ‘new and additional’ (see page 
40), and that finance is not double-counted or a displacement 
of ODA commitments.
The current scale of finance through ODA from members of the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is 
approximately USD 130 billion per year8 (OECD, 2010). In 2007 
approximately USD 3.75 billion9, around 3% of the total aid budget, 
was marked as also targeting biodiversity in developing countries. 
The current levels of ODA are less than half of the commitments 
laid out under the Monterrey Consensus of 0.7% of GNI (~ USD 285 
billion) to achieve development objectives (OECD, 2010). If aid 
targets are met and the percentage of finance that is marked as 
biodiversity-related stays consistent ODA could raise up to USD 8 
billion per annum for ecosystems. Whilst ODA has increased in the 
past decade, the percentage of ODA going towards the environment 
is dwindling (Castro and Hammond, 2009), and it is therefore 
unlikely that ODA will be able to deliver ecosystem finance at scale, 
whilst also delivering essential development needs.
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6. Includes protected 
area funding based on 
James et. al 1999 and 
assuming no change in 
real spending on 
protected areas (so 
inflated values from 1996 
dollars to 2010 dollars). 
Included additional 
financing from US, EU, 
and China based on Walls 
et al 2009, Cooper et al 
2009, Adelle et al 2009, 
Stanton et al 2010.
TIMEFRAME
SCALE
24.2
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CASE STUDY
COSTA RICA‘S PSA
Costa Rica is world renowned for its 
experimentation with innovative policy to 
protect its natural resources. In 1996, Costa 
Rica enacted the Forest Law 7575, which 
introduced incentive-based measures to 
compensate forest owners for the conservation 
of forest functions that provide environmental 
services to society (De Camino et al., 2000). 
The law explicitly recognised four 
environmental services provided by forest 
ecosystems: (i) mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions; (ii) hydrological services, including 
provision of water for human consumption, 
irrigation, and energy production; (iii) 
biodiversity conservation; and (iv) provision of 
scenic beauty for recreation and ecotourism. To 
secure these services, a system of payments for 
environmental services (Pagos por Servicios 
Ambientales)(PSA) was introduced. The PSA 
programme is managed by the National 
Forestry Finance Fund (Fondo Nacional de 
Financiamiento Forestal)(FONAFIFO) and 
compensates owners of forests and forest 
plantations for conserving, managing or 
restoring forests.
REVENUE GENERATION 
Prior to introducing the PSA programme, there 
was concern over Costa Rica’s high rates of 
deforestation and dwindling timber supplies. In 
response, the government introduced a series 
of forest certificates to encourage timber 
plantations. These were essentially positive tax 
incentives financed by the government’s 
general budget. The Forest Law built on this 
foundation, but introduced two crucial 
changes. First, the justification for paying 
forest owners was no longer for timber (an 
ecosystem good), but rather for the provision of 
ecosystem services. Secondly, the source of 
financing was changed from the government 
budget to an earmarked tax and payments 
from beneficiaries. 
The PSA program receives revenue from three 
main sources. Firstly, the Forest Law 
implemented a tax on fossil fuel sales and 
earmarked 3.5% of these revenues for the PSA 
program10. The fossil fuel tax provides about 
USD 10 million a year to the programme, 
equivalent to about a quarter of the total 
revenue for the PSA. Another portion of 
revenue is raised from the international 
community, through ODA and philanthropy, to 
secure the biodiversity benefits of the PSA 
programme. Because these sources were never 
intended to be ongoing, efforts to collect 
revenues from tourism and establish an 
endowment fund are being explored. The third 
main source of revenue is a levy on water 
payments. This mechanism previously relied on 
voluntary water agreements with large water 
users including hydropower companies, 
agribusinesses, a bottling company, and a hotel 
company. In 2005, however, the government 
revised its water tariff structure and introduced 
an additional conservation fee. That fee raises 
around USD 19 million annually, 25% of which 
is used for the PSA programme (with 50% for 
the Ministry of Environment and Energy’s Water 
Department and 25% for Protected Area 
financing). Finally, some financing is generated 
intermittently through large agreements to pay 
for forest carbon credits. 
DELIVERY
The PSA programme delivers finance through 
performance-based payments (see page 101) 
to landowners across the country. Payments for 
forest protection, management, and 
regeneration are made over a 5-year period, 
while agroforestry 
payments are made over 3 years and 
reforestation payments made over ten years 
(Daniels et al., 2010). By 2008 over 10,000 
contracts had been issued under the PSA 
programme, with USD 206 million paid out to 
private landowners (an average of USD 17.2 
million per year since 1997; Porras, 2010a) 
protecting 668,369 hectares of land (Daniels 
et al., 2010). 
The programme has been challenged, however, 
to demonstrate equity in its application. Poor 
farmers have faced high transaction costs and 
difficulty in securing contracts, with larger 
operations securing contracts on a first-come, 
first-served basis (Porras, 2010a). Acting on 
these concerns, the PSA went through a series 
of changes in 2004 to lower barriers to 
participation for the poorer farmers with 
smaller landholdings. One change made was to 
give preference to applicants from regions with 
a low Social Development Index (SDI). These 
regions are now well represented in the 
allocation of PSA, and represent 25% of all 
contracts (Porras, 2010b). 
Although there have been limited efforts to 
create a truly ‘pro-poor’ PSA system, the PSA 
system is associated with significant benefits at 
local, national and global levels, including the 
protection of the quality of water, carbon 
sequestration, conservation of biodiversity, 
health and infrastructure improvement, and the 
reduction of poverty in certain areas (Hartshorn 
et al., 2005). 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The Forest Law mandated that FONAFIFO - a 
semi-autonomous institution with independent 
legal status - collect revenues and implement 
the PSA programme. FONAFIFO’s status gives 
it a relative degree of autonomy in making 
personnel decisions and in managing funds, 
but it remains subject to a variety of 
governmental restrictions. Its governing board 
includes a representative from the private 
sector, but is dominated by three 
representatives from the public sector, 
representing the Ministry of Environment and 
Energy, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the 
National Banking System. Further, the Ministry 
of Finance must approve FONAFIFO’s budget.
Based on (Brown and Bird, 2010) and 
(Pagiola, 2008)
10. Fiscal Reform Law No.8114 introduced in 2001 reduced FONAFIFO’s share of fuel tax revenues to just 3.5%, but guaranteed 
this amount. (pp. 713 in Pagiola, 2008)
DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAP
Under debt swaps, contributing countries agree to cancel a portion 
of the (non-performing) debt obligation of a recipient country in 
exchange for an investment in projects in that country. Swaps 
allow highly indebted countries the possibility to relieve a portion 
of their debt that they are unlikely to ever repay in full, but with a 
commitment to improve provision of public goods within the 
country. In the case of debt-for-nature (DfN) swaps, the finance 
raised is used for biodiversity conservation. Debt swaps are 
already being used to finance environmental conservation and 
health projects in many developing countries (Doornbosch and 
Knight, 2008, Ruiz, 2007).
In the 1990s, when DfN swaps were at their peak, they raised 
around USD 100 million a year (Pearce, 2004)11. The volume of 
DfN swaps has decreased in recent years and is now around USD 
10-20 million per year (USAID, 2006). Although DfN swaps raise 
relatively small scales of finance compared with other 
mechanisms, there is some scope to increase the use of this 
mechanism by increasing the use of multilateral debt through 
organizations such as the World Bank (Pearce, 2004) to link a 
greater proportion of debt reduction to conservation outcomes13.
Two major risks of DfN financing are currency and political risk 
(WWF, 2009). Local currency devaluation or inflation can reduce 
the real cash value of conservation commitments. There is also a 
risk that revenue received by debtor governments will not be spent 
on conservation but will be captured by national government 
agencies for other purposes (see page 46). To avoid these risks, 
DfN financing is usually delivered through a conservation trust 
fund (see page 134) with measures taken to hedge currency risk.
SUBSIDY REFORM
Subsidy reform seeks to reduce or remove existing subsidies that 
are harmful to the environment. Subsidies are introduced to 
promote economic growth, secure employment and increase 
production by small producers. While these are core objectives of 
both developed and developing country governments alike, 
subsidies are often harmful to biodiversity and ecosystem services.
The benefits of subsidy reform are twofold: the reform of subsidies 
would not only deliver considerable benefits to the environment 
through a reduction of the negative impacts of environmentally 
harmful subsidies, but it would also free up domestic finance that 
can be hypothecated to environmental protection. It is important 
therefore not just to reform environmentally harmful subsidies, 
but also to reform subsidies that have clearly outlived their 
purpose, are not targeted towards their stated objectives, or do not 
reach their objectives in a cost-effective manner.
The current scale of finance to subsidies in key sectors (agriculture, 
fisheries, mining and energy) is around USD 1 trillion per year. 
Agricultural subsidies are estimated to be USD 261 billion per 
annum for OECD countries and energy subsidies are around USD 
500 billion per annum globally (TEEB, 2009b). Using conservative 
estimates a reform of these subsidies could raise between USD 
10-20 billion annually13. 
Since most subsidies operate at the national level, there will need 
to be clear policies in place to ensure that any recovered finance 
through subsidy reform is hypothecated towards biodiversity 
objectives (see page 41). If revenues are delivered internationally 
(i.e. from developed to developing countries), it will also be critical 
for recipient countries to rationalise and phase out their own 
environmentally harmful subsidies.
11. Based on an average 
of data from 1987-2003 
that includes leveraged 
finance but excludes a 
single abnormally large 
deal in Poland.
12. Up to 2007, 
conditional debt swaps 
have directed USD 7 
billion for domestic 
development Ruiz, 2007.
13. Estimate is based on 
a 1 - 2% reduction in the 
subsidies to developing 
countries. This figure is a 
conservative estimate 
given that countries such 
as Norway have reduced 
subsidies to 
environmentally harmful 
practices by up to 80% 
(TEEB, 2009).
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PHILANTHROPY
Philanthropy as a source of finance includes contributions from 
private foundations, businesses-related foundations, and 
conservation NGOs such as the Nature Conservancy and the World 
Wildlife Fund. Large philanthropic foundations generate revenue 
through an initial endowment that is managed in perpetuity 
(Persson et al., 2009). The finance available for charitable 
distribution from these endowments is directly dependent on the 
success of the commercial investments made by the foundations, 
since the investment returns are then used to deliver philanthropic 
grants. Conservation NGOs on the other hand generate revenue 
from a variety of sources including subscription fees, foundations 
and government contributions.
The scale of finance available from grants is not likely to be large. 
For example, in 2007 the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
distributed in total around USD 1.9 billion in charitable grants and 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s long- term intention is to provide the 
equivalent of around USD 225 million in grants annually (Persson 
et al., 2009). The combined annual budget of five international 
environmental NGOs was estimated as USD 2 billion in recent 
years (Gutman and Davidson, 2008). Although these figures 
represent only a sample of private sector philanthropy, they go to a 
diverse set of priorities beyond biodiversity financing; therefore 
only a fraction of these flows are likely to go towards biodiversity 
and ecosystems14. 
Whilst the sustainability and predictability of philanthropic grants 
from the private sector is difficult to estimate, downturns in the 
global economy will likely negatively impact the level of investment 
from philanthropy. Although private philanthropy is unlikely to 
deliver finance at the same scale as other sources of private finance 
it can be used for activities that offer no or low returns on 
investment.
14. The figure of USD 1–2 
billion used here comes 
from Gutman and 
Davidson, 2008 but is not 
considered to be a precise 
estimate of philanthropic 
finance.
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COMPLEMENTING CLIMATE AND 
BIODIVERSITY FINANCE 
Currently forest loss accounts for around 15% 
of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (Van 
Der Werf et al., 2009), and the loss of 
biodiversity is costing at least USD 740 per 
annum, and that cost is increasing each year 
(Braat and ten Brink, 2009). REDD is an 
international mechanism being negotiated 
under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to 
reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries. The basic 
idea behind REDD is simple; countries that are 
willing and able to reduce emissions from 
deforestation should be compensated for doing 
so (Scholz and Schmidt, 2008). 
REDD negotiations have come a long way since 
the idea was first proposed under the UNFCCC 
at COP 11 in Montreal in 2005. Parties to the 
climate Convention now broadly agree on the 
framework for a REDD mechanism and a draft 
text was all but agreed in Copenhagen in 2009. 
If an international mechanism is successfully 
agreed under the UN climate change 
negotiations, it would be a significant and 
unprecedented step forward in the fight against 
deforestation and the broader fight against 
climate change. In general, a well-designed 
REDD mechanism is likely to deliver substantial 
benefits for biodiversity and ES since reducing 
deforestation and degradation implies a decline 
in habitat destruction and thus in biodiversity 
loss (Karousakis, 2009). Some elements of the 
REDD mechanism, however, if not designed 
correctly, may create potential risks - or 
perverse outcomes - for biodiversity, for 
example the current definition of forests under 
the UNFCCC fails to recognise the conversion 
of natural forest to plantations, a practice that 
result in significant losses in biodiversity and 
ecosystem services. 
Under the Bali Action Plan15 REDD was given 
the broad objective to “promote co-benefits 
and complement the aims and objectives of 
other relevant international conventions and 
agreements” of which a notable example is the 
CBD (Karousakis, 2009). The current 
negotiating text under the UNFCCC16 is more 
explicit and includes safeguards that should be 
taken under consideration when designing and 
implementing REDD, one of these aims 
specifically to address the issue of converting 
natural forests to plantations.
If REDD is to fully meet the objectives of the 
CBD, however, the CBD should develop a set of 
guidelines for national stakeholders on how to 
mainstream biodiversity considerations into the 
implementation of REDD (Benick et al., 2010). 
In addition the CBD could outline a series of 
efforts that can be undertaken which would 
help to incorporate biodiversity co-benefits into 
REDD in an efficient and informed manner.
There are two basic ways in which REDD 
finance and biodiversity finance can work 
together. Firstly, by improving our 
understanding of the spatial distribution and 
overlaps of ecosystem services and biodiversity 
hotspots with climate change multiple policy 
goals. Some areas that could be prioritised are 
forests, agriculture, peatlands and coastal 
zones (CBD, 2010b). Secondly, biodiversity 
finance can be used to stimulate additional 
climate finance by reducing the incremental 
cost of mitigation and adaptation activities in 
developing countries in areas that have high 
marginal costs (see page 111).
15. The Bali Action Plan can be found online at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf
16. Document FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/L.7/Add.6 is the final negotiation text emerging from Copenhagen, but Parties did not come 
to a Decision on REDD at this meeting.
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DIRECT PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
Direct payments for ecosystem services (PES) are payments (or 
other positive incentives) from ecosystem service beneficiaries for 
the sustainable flow of those services. Direct PES can be more 
specifically defined as arrangements where the beneficiary pays 
and the ecosystem services that flow to them are not wholly public 
but are to some degree captured by the those beneficiaries. It is 
important to note that direct PES do not involve the creation of an 
offset or credit (see pages 61 and 62).
The most common example of direct PES are payments for 
watershed services (PWS) where downstream water users pay 
upstream landholders to carry out sustainable land practices and 
so increase the quantity and quality of water running downstream. 
PWS, therefore provide the best estimates for the scale of finance 
for direct PES. In 2008, PWS transactions totalled over USD 9 
billion (Stanton et al., 2010) and it is estimated that they could 
increase to USD 30 billion annually by 2050 (Ecosystem 
Marketplace, 2008).
In PWS, payments are often made by beverage companies, 
municipal governments, hydroelectric generators or through water 
use fees (Stanton et al., 2010). Government mediated PES may 
require other forms of revenue generation, but can still be 
considered direct PES that raises new and additional finance if 
revenue is raised from one of these mechanisms (see e.g., Mexico 
case study on page 66).
The success of direct PES will depend on downstream beneficiaries 
(or the organisations that represent them) understanding the 
direct-use values of ES to them and the uptake of tools designed for 
corporate ES valuation by companies, municipalities, utilities, 
farmers’ associations, and so on, is an important step for the 
expansion of direct PES (see e.g. Hanson et al., 2007).
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PAYMENTS FROM LOCAL TO 
GLOBAL SCALES
Whilst payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
have traditionally been implemented at the 
project level, due perhaps to a growing 
awareness of the regional and international 
benefits of ecosystem services (see page 18), 
examples of PES schemes are emerging that 
have been scaled up to the national and even 
international level. 
LOCAL: QUITO WATER FUND, ECUADOR17
Quito is one of the many major cities in the 
world that depend on upstream ecological 
reserves for its water supply; with about 80% 
of the city’s drinking water coming from the 
Antisana and the Cayambe-Coca ecological 
reserves. In 2000 the Ecuadorian government 
established the Quito Fater Fund (Fondo para la 
protección del Agua; FONAG) as a trust fund to 
support conservation activities in these two 
reserves and the Guyallbamba watershed to 
protect Quito’s water resources.
FONAG receives contributions from a blend of 
public and private sources including a private 
brewing company, a water bottling company, 
and the municipal water and electrical utilities 
of Quito18. To date, FONAG has achieved an 
endowment of USD 6 million and has invested 
USD 2.3 million in watershed conservation, 
while leveraging USD 7 million in additional 
contributions to the projects financed. The fund 
provides a successful model for other cities 
around the world where water supply is 
dependent on the sustainable management 
of upstream land. Similar funds are being 
developed throughout the world, including 11 
other cities in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.
The two major lessons from FONAG, echoed by 
other watershed conservation and PES 
experience around the world are, firstly, that 
programme proponents must raise awareness 
of the importance of watershed protection by 
tangibly demonstrating the value of upstream 
land management to downstream water users. 
Secondly, with that value demonstrated, the 
key ecosystem service beneficiaries must be 
identified, prioritized and informed of why they 
should contribute funds to the PES programme 
and how they can do so.
NATIONAL: MEXICO’S PAYMENTS FOR 
HYDROLOGICAL SERVICES19
Water scarcity is one of Mexico’s most pressing 
environmental challenges. Nearly all of the 
country’s 188 most important aquifers are 
overexploited or at full capacity. To address this 
issue, in 2003, Mexico established a 
programme of payments for hydrological 
environmental services (‘Pagos por Servicios 
Ambientales Hidrológicos’; PSAH). The 
programme aims to secure Mexico’s water 
supply by paying locals to conserve well-
preserved forests that are at risk of 
deforestation.
The PSAH programme maintains a direct link 
between ecosystem service buyers and 
providers on a national scale by raising revenue 
from national water fees20. The fees have raise 
on average USD 27.3 million annually 
(equivalent to approximately 4% of total water 
revenues) and have been used to directly 
finance the PSAH programme. 
As Mexico’s PSAH programme was the first 
such national PES mechanism to be 
implemented it had to overcome two key 
challenges. The first hurdle was to earmark the 
revenues from the scheme to pay for forest 
conservation. A related issue was that some 
officials perceived water scarcity as a problem 
of man-made infrastructure, not natural 
capital, Following a scientific study that 
highlighted the importance of forests in some 
17. Based on (Stanton et al., 2010);(Arias et al., 2010); (FONAG)
18. The water utility contributes 1% of total water sales to the fund and is an example of direct PES. Additional funds are 
generated through philanthropy and ODA and are given to support other environmental and social benefits of the conservation 
projects beyond protection of watershed services
19. Based on (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008).
20. Mexico’s water bodies are considered national property, so the government is allowed to charge for their use.
21. Based on (UNDP, 2010); (Positive, 2010); (BBC, 2010)
areas, and applying the precautionary principle 
for the rest of the country, Mexico’s PSAH 
programme went ahead. It is now working 
alongside Mexico‘s Programme of Payments 
for Carbon, Biodiversity and Agro-forestry 
Services (PSA-CABSA, established 2004) as 
an integral component of Mexico’s ecosystem 
finance policy. 
INTERNATIONAL: YASUNI ITT21
The Yasuni National Park, in Ecuador, is one of 
the world’s most biologically diverse reserves 
and is home to several indigenous groups, 
including the Tagaeri and Taromenane 
indigenous peoples who remain in voluntary 
isolation. The Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini 
(ITT) concession located in the Yasuni Park 
holds 846 million barrels of oil, representing 
20% of the country’s total oil reserves, and 
although that oil could generate USD 7.2 billion 
for Ecuador, extraction would endanger the 
National Park and the livelihoods and wellbeing 
of the people living within its boundaries. 
In 2007, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa 
offered to ban oil extraction from the 
concession and preserve the rainforest 
standing over it if the international community 
compensates Ecuador for at least half of the 
foregone oil revenue amounting to USD 3.6 
billion over 13 years. On August 3, 2010, a 
deal was struck between the Government of 
Ecuador and the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) to establish a trust fund 
administered by UNDP to handle finance raised 
to compensate Ecuador’s foregone oil revenues.
In exchange for contributions to the Yasuni 
Fund, the Ecuadorian Government will provide 
Yasuni Guarantee Certificates (Certificados 
Guarantias de Yasuni; CGYs) that will indicate 
the amount of finance contributed (in USD) and 
the amount of carbon emissions avoided by not 
burning the fossil fuels that have forgone 
extraction. The conservation of the Yasuni 
Natioanal Park will also deliver enormous 
benefits for biodiversity and for the indigenous 
peoples of the Yasuni.
CAP-AND-TRADE MARKET
Biodiversity and ecosystem service cap-and-trade markets involve 
the trade or exchange of allowances within in a national or 
sub-national market. Allowances essentially give polluters the 
right to negatively impact biodiversity or ecosystem services; they 
can be based on measurements of the level of ecosystem service 
impacted by the polluter (e.g. tonnes of carbon emitted or level of 
nitrogen emitted into watercourse), an area of habitat impacted 
(e.g. hectares of forest) or the status of one or more species of 
interest. Under a cap-and-trade market, the total number of 
allowances allocated to entities within a market is capped to limit 
the overall impact on the environment. Polluters within that 
market can then either mitigate their impact directly or trade 
allowances with another entity that has a surplus of allowances.
An example of ecosystem service cap-and-trade markets are the 
water quality trading (WQT) programs popular in the US. WQT 
programmes traded USD 11 million in 2008 (Stanton et al., 2010) 
and with significant government action this figure could increase 
by one or two orders of magnitude globally by 2020 (Ecosystem 
Marketplace, 2008). 
Examples of biodiversity cap-and-trade mechanisms (also known 
as tradable rights) include tradable development rights (TDRs), 
individual fishing quotas (IFQs), and territorial use rights for 
fisheries (TURFs). Cap-and-trade mechanisms for fisheries are 
used extensively, with IFQ transactions estimated to total USD 
5-10 billion globally (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2008).
The scale of finance under a cap-and-trade mechanism is difficult 
to estimate. The figures referred to above represent secondary 
transactions in a cap-and-trade market, and are not indicative of 
the scale of finance invested in abating impacts on biodiversity. 
The two most important factors for both the scale of finance and 
the environmental effectiveness under a cap-and-trade 
mechanism are the strictness of the overall cap and the method of 
allocation of allowances. Placing a strict cap on allowances 
incentivises polluters to take stronger actions to reduce their 
impact on biodiversity and ecosystem services, and innovative 
mechanisms for the allocation of allowances including auctions 
can raise additional ecosystem finance (see page 71).
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22. See http://cdm.
unfccc.int/index.html or 
The Little Climate 
Finance Book.
BASELINE-AND-CREDIT MARKET
Baseline-and-credit markets are arrangements in which the 
polluter pays for the negative impact they impose on the 
environment by purchasing credits or offsets. The Clean 
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol is an example of a 
baseline-and-credit market22. Under this system a credit or offset 
representing the right to pollute is generated through the 
sustainable management of an ecosystem. A polluter can then 
purchase this credit to meet their (voluntary or legal) obligations to 
offset any negative impact they impose on an ecosystem. Baseline-
and-credit mechanisms must establish a business-as-usual level 
(known as the baseline) before an offset can be awarded.
The most common examples of baseline-and-credit markets are 
the voluntary forest carbon market and biodiversity offsetting (see 
page 70). Forest carbon markets collectively raised USD 150 
million in 2009 (Hamilton et al., 2010) and could generate USD 7 
billion in 2020 (Eliasch, 2008); biodiversity offsets raised at least 
USD 1.5-2.5 billion annually in 2009 and could generate USD 10 
billion in 2020 (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2008). Whilst some level 
of revenue can be raised through voluntary mechanisms, 
regulation is required to increase the scale of finance that can be 
raised through these schemes (eftec et al., 2010).
The single most important factor for a baseline-and-credit 
mechanism is the strictness of the baseline. If baselines are set 
too low then offsets can be generated that offer no real benefit to 
the environment. Similarly if baselines are set too high, there 
will be less incentive for offset providers to sustainably manage 
their resources.
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CASE STUDY
BUSINESS AND BIODIVERSITY 
OFFSET PROGRAMME (BBOP)
Biodiversity offsets provide a way to achieve 
better conservation outcomes than typically 
result from project planning. Companies using 
a biodiversity offset go beyond traditional 
mitigation of impacts and take responsibility for 
the full biodiversity impact of projects by 
planning for ‘no net loss’ of biodiversity. Thus, 
biodiversity offsetting is a mechanism for 
raising new and additional ecosystem financing 
from the private sector, which can help 
governments achieve the conservation targets 
they have adopted in national biodiversity 
strategies and action plans. 
More than 30 countries have laws requiring 
biodiversity offsets, while some are exploring 
policy frameworks for offsets, and many others 
currently require some form of compensatory 
conservation. Clear guidance by government 
through biodiversity offset policy is welcome as 
it offers companies legal certainty, efficiency 
and cost savings in the planning process, 
and flexibility in how to achieve agreed 
conservation goals. 
But what about when a country has no law or 
the law regarding biodiversity offsets is 
unclear? In the absence of a policy requirement 
for no net loss, companies can undertake 
voluntary offsetting, usually delivered in the 
form of one-off bespoke offsets. Companies 
that choose to do this are generally companies 
with a footprint on biodiversity that represents 
a distinct business risk for them such as 
companies involved in mining, oil and gas, 
hydropower, wind power, road projects, 
railways, housing development, tourism and 
some forms of agriculture. Governments, 
financial institutions, and civil society 
increasingly expect these types of companies 
to take full responsibility for their biodiversity 
impacts. Biodiversity offsets offer a way to 
do that by ensuring no net loss of biodiversity 
and improving outcomes for local communities, 
thus reducing operational and project 
development risks, while maintaining a 
company’s licence to operate. 
The Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme (BBOP) is an international 
partnership working with the vision and 
expectation that biodiversity offsetting will 
become a standard part of business practice 
for companies with a significant impact on 
biodiversity. To support the development of 
biodiversity impacts, BBOP is trialing best 
management practices through a portfolio of 
biodiversity offset pilot sites; disseminating 
guidelines, methodologies and ultimately 
standards for biodiversity offsets; and 
supporting governments in the development 
of policy on biodiversity offsets. 
Becca Madsen, Ecosystem Marketplace
http://bbop.forest-trends.org
AUCTIONING OF ALLOWANCES
The national or international auction of allowances is a new and 
additional source of finance for biodiversity and ecosystem 
services that has been discussed under the UNFCCC.  Assigned 
amount units (AAUs) are tradable units derived from an Annex I 
Party’s emissions target under the Kyoto Protocol. They may be 
counted by Annex I Parties towards compliance with their 
emissions target and are equal to equivalent to 1 tCO2e. Under this 
mechanism, a percentage of assigned amount units or allowances 
could be withheld from national or international quota allocations 
and auctioned via an appropriate institution. At the international 
level, the auction process could be open to both Annex I 
governments with national or regional commitments and private 
compliance buyers with obligations under a national cap and trade 
system. Nationally, the process for selling or auctioning allowances 
can vary and several options have been proposed under national or 
regional Emissions Trading Schemes (ETSs).
The key feature of this mechanism is that it would require either 
national governments or private sector compliance buyers to pay 
for their allowances instead of being allocated them for free. There 
are many reasons both economically and environmentally why 
auctioning allowances is preferable to giving them away. Since 
there would be a price associated with allowances, auctioning 
would avoid the generation of windfall profits and would generate 
revenue that can then be earmarked towards further 
environmental actions. Auctioning allowances would also avoid 
market distortions between newcomers and incumbents and 
would stimulate further emissions reductions under a cap.
The scale of revenue from auctions will depend on several factors 
including the demand for allowances within ETSs, the percentage 
of allowances auctioned and the percentage of revenues allocated 
to international biodiversity and ES. Based on current estimates 
the national or international auctioning of allowances might raise 
USD 2-8 billion annually for ecosystem finance23.
23. Based on the 
estimates of USD 8-30 
billion for national 
auctioning of allowances 
and USD 9-35 billion for 
international auctioning 
of allowances (Parker et 
al, 2009) and assuming 
that only 25% of this 
revenue will go towards 
biodiversity and ES 
finance (see page 75).
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NATURAL CAPITAL TAX
A natural capital tax can either place a price on the extraction 
of renewable natural resources (e.g. fee on timber extraction) or 
activities that negatively impact the provision of biodiversity or 
ecosystem services (e.g. development tax). Following the polluter 
pays principal, natural capital taxes attempt to internalise the cost 
of ecosystem degradation. Pricing the use of natural capital has a 
two-fold effect: it raises revenue that can then be used for 
investments in biodiversity and ecosystem preservation, and also 
reduces the overall direct use (or degradation) of natural capital. 
As such, any tax that is implemented needs to balance these effects 
to achieve the desired outcome.
Although the potential scale of revenue from natural capital 
pricing is difficult to estimate, it could be substantial. For example, 
in the 1990s both Guinea Bissau and Mauritania received 30% 
of government revenues from the fishing sector (OECD, 2005). 
Similarly, governments only capture approximately 15-30% of 
the profit (i.e. resource rents) associated with forest resource 
extraction (OECD, 2005) leaving 70-85% in the hands of the 
private sector and significant potential for increasing 
government revenues.
Importantly, however, compared to other mechanisms for raising 
ecosystem finance, tax revenues are particularly susceptible to 
both government capture (see page 46) and are often politically 
difficult to introduce. In many cases, however, natural capital 
taxes do not need to be introduced; they simply need to be better 
enforced. For example, in Tanzania, USD 100 million is lost every 
year due to lack of enforcement in the charcoal sector 
(World Bank, 2009).
 
Natural capital taxes will be relevant for both countries that are 
rich in renewable or ‘living’ natural capital and countries that have 
rapidly developing industrial or agricultural sectors. Since the 
former often tend to be low-income countries, support may be 
required to ensure that this mechanism doesn’t negatively impact 
economic development.
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24. As taxes at airports, 
hotels, etc. For example, 
Belize imposes a USD 
3.75 conservation fee at 
the airport, in addition to 
their normal US$11.25 
airport departure tax.
25. Global tourism in 
2009 accounted for USD 
5,751 billion, which was 
9.2% of global GDP, in 
2009 (WTTC, 2010). 
Therefore 2 -4% of this is 
equivalent to USD 
115-230 billion.
USER FEES
User fees are payments for access to or direct use of biodiversity 
and are a widely used mechanism for raising ecosystem finance. 
User fees are mostly generated through tourism and recreation 
activities in areas with high conservation value and are typically 
implemented at the project level through entrance fees to national 
parks, and licences and permits, but can also be implemented at 
the national level24.
For national level user fees to deliver benefits to the environment 
there need to be clear policies in place to direct generated funds to 
financing biodiversity and ecosystem service provision. In the case 
of the Belize conservation fees (an additional fee on the normal 
airport departure tax), revenue goes directly to the ‘Protected Area 
Conservation Trust’ (PACT) that operates independently from 
national government (CFA, 2003).
Whilst the global scale of user fees is difficult to estimate, the 
global value of eco-tourism provides an indication of the scale of 
financing that user fees might generate. Conservatively assuming 
eco-tourism accounts for 2-4% of all global tourism25 (Fennell, 
2007) and that just 1% of this goes directly towards biodiversity 
conservation and ES provision, user fees currently raise USD 1-2 
billion per year. This figure can be expected to increase over the 
coming decade as the tourism sector is expected to grow to around 
USD 11 trillion by 2020 (WTTC, 2010) and eco-tourism is a rapidly 
growing tourism subsector (Honey, 2008).
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BIOPROSPECTING
Bioprospecting is the search within natural ecosystems for genetic 
information that may be commercially valuable. Bioprospecting 
agreements between governments and firms (typically 
pharmaceutical companies or academic institutions) grant the 
firms the exclusive rights to screen biodiversity for useful genetic 
information (i.e. potential pharmaceutical compounds). In return, 
firms compensate governments up-front and usually agree to share 
a portion of the profits if any commercial product is developed.
Although conservationists initially placed great hope in the 
promise of bioprospecting to recognise the value of nature and 
increase financing for conservation, few successful and sustainable 
bioprospecting agreements have been reached to date. The largest 
hurdle to an increase in the scale of bioprospecting agreements is a 
better understanding of the value of naturally-occurring genetic 
resources to overcome biological problems (i.e. pest, plagues and 
pathogens). Genetic resources will be valuable if biological 
problems continue to arise at a constant or increasing rate and 
genetic resources are perceived an important part of the solution 
compared to presently uncertain human technologies 
(Sarr et al, 2008).
The best example of bioprospecting is the National Biodiversity 
Institute (INBio) of Costa Rica, which raises approximately USD 
4.2 million annually from grants and contracts with research 
institutions and companies (WWF, 2009) of which 10% is donated 
to Costa Rica’s Ministry of Energy and Environment for direct 
biodiversity conservation (INBio, 2010). The most comprehensive 
theoretical estimate of the value of bioprospecting is USD 0.4-1.9 
billion per year across the world’s 34 biodiversity hotspots 
(Costello and Ward, 2006)26 and extrapolation from the INBio 
experience supports this low-end estimate27. There is still room, 
however, for bioprospecting to raise more ecosystem finance, 
considering it is estimated that 25-50% of pharmaceutical 
products are derived from genetic resources (Ten Kate and Laird, 
1999) in a global market worth around USD 640 billion in 2006 
(TEEB, 2009a).
26. The range is based on 
the average net present 
value of $14/ha based on 
the global total number of 
species and $60/ha 
based only on species 
present in biodiversity 
hotspots; a 10% discount 
rate was used to estimate 
annual values
27. Extrapolating the per 
hectare annual payment 
to all 34 biodiversity 
hotspots with adjustment 
for average species 
density based on Costello 
and Ward, 2006
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28. This figure is based 
on an estimated 5-10% 
price premium on all 
certified agricultural 
goods. To illustrate this, 
Rainforest Alliance 
certified coffee, receives 
a price premium of 
around 10% over the 
basic cost of production 
of coffee. 
GREENING COMMODITIES
Green commodities generate finance directly from consumers by 
applying a price premium to goods that are produced using 
biodiversity-friendly methods. A common example is shade-grown 
coffee, which is produced under a canopy of tropical trees, rather 
than in a deforested field to provide habitat for tropical species 
along with other ecosystem services such as climate change 
mitigation (see page 18). When consumers purchase a green 
commodity, they pay a certain price for the consumption of the 
private good (for example drinking coffee), and an additional price 
premium for the provision of the public good (in this case the 
sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystem services). 
The great innovation of green commodities is that by bundling 
environmental benefits into commodity markets, ecosystems 
services can be traded on the global scale of the markets in which 
they operate.
The potential scale of finance from green commodities is 
significant. For green commodities to be successful, however, there 
needs to be complementarity between environmental and 
production goals and markets for green commodities need to be 
large enough to support a price premium for public goods 
(Kotchen, 2005, Kotchen, 2006). Compared to other green 
products, therefore, agricultural commodities are a promising 
policy option, since environmental practices often lead to 
sustained commodity production and agricultural markets operate 
at a national to global scale. Global retail sales of certified 
agricultural and forest products accounts for over USD 42 billion 
and could reach USD 210 billion by 2020 (Ecosystem Marketplace, 
2008). Only a fraction of the total market value, however, will be 
available to finance biodiversity and ecosystem services. By 2020 
certified products could generate new and additional ecosystem 
finance of around USD 10.5 billion annually to compensate farmers 
for implementing more sustainable agricultural practices28.
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CASE STUDY
RAINFOREST ALLIANCE 
CERTIFIED COFFEE
The coffee tree is a thin understory tree native 
to East African rainforest. As it was introduced 
in other parts of the world, it was traditionally 
farmed through agroforestry production 
systems under existing canopy. A push for 
intensification of agriculture in the 1970s, 
however, removed a lot of that canopy 
and many coffee systems became less 
sustainable monocultures. 
Promoting a return to sustain able coffee 
production is a crucial tool in biodiversity 
conservation. Coffee is farmed on over 10 
million hectares worldwide, almost all of which 
occurs in one of the world’s thirteen biodiversity 
hotspots. Shade-grown coffee can be used to 
protect watersheds, serve as wildlife corridors, 
and act as buffer zones to protected areas. 
And it provides additional ecosystem services 
such as non-timber forest products and 
carbon sequestration. 
By certifying production, the ecosystem 
services sustainable coffee production provides 
can be bundled and sold with the commodity of 
coffee across global scales. While the price 
premium for these services varies, buyers often 
pay 10-12 cents per pound more for certified 
coffee, which is about 10% of the value at the 
farm gate. Annual sales of Rainforest Alliance 
certified coffee are estimated at around USD 1 
billion, meaning farmers receive up to USD 100 
million each year in return of the ecosystem 
services they provide. 
Most coffee producers get certified because 
they want improved markets access and better 
prices. But beyond improving income, certified 
production also requires producers to become 
better farm managers, improves worker 
conditions, and strengthens social and 
economic networks. So certified production 
can have a profound impact on improving both 
the environmental and social benefits of that 
production. With more than 25 million people 
in the tropics dependent on coffee production, 
it is clear that certification is an important tool 
for sustainable development.
Leif Pedersen, Rainforest Alliance
http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/certification
NATURAL CAPITAL BONDS
A bond is a form of fixed-income security that provides a way to 
raise up front financing through capital markets. Investors in 
bonds receive a fixed rate of return in the form of an annual coupon 
plus repayment of the initial investment (called the principal) upon 
maturity. Bonds are a common form of investment in the financial 
community and have recently become more popular within the 
development and environment communities as a result of the 
successful issuance of immunization bonds, climate bonds, a water 
bond and various proposals for tropical forest bonds. Since bonds 
are a form of debt, the most important question with the issuance 
of any bond used for innovative finance is how it will be repaid 
(Keiss, 2009).
Three primary models for innovative finance bonds have been 
suggested. The first option is a corporate bond issued by an 
organisation such as the World Bank to finance a set of investments 
or projects (see e.g. Riechalt, 2010). The repayment of a corporate 
bond is financed by the general operations of the issuing 
organisation. The second option is a bond backed by future ODA 
commitments of national governments (see e.g. IFFIm, 2010).  A 
concern with this model, however, is that it merely frontloads 
government commitments and doesn’t generate new and 
additional finance29. The third option is an asset-backed security 
(ABS), where bond repayment is directly dependent on future cash 
flows arising from the investments made with the capital raised. 
The ABS option would also require significant credit enhancement 
through, for example, guarantees from international finance 
institutions (see page 112).
In 2008, governments and government-backed entities issued 
USD 3 trillion in bonds, of which USD 400 billion were Sovereign, 
Supranational, and Agency Bonds (The Prince’s Rainforests 
Project, 2009), which is how a forest or other natural capital bond 
would likely be categorised. International capital markets could 
readily digest on the order of USD 10 billion30 (equivalent to 2.5% 
of the market) more each year as indicated by the steady increase 
in “innovative” debt offerings for development in the past decade, 
reaching USD 11.3 billion in 2008 (Girishankar, 2009).
29. To alleviate concerns 
of frontloading a 
variation of this option 
would be to use other 
innovative financial 
mechanisms that take 
some time to implement, 
such as an auctioning of 
allowances, to generate 
new and additional 
finance to repay the bond.
30. The high and low 
estimates shown here use 
1% and 5% of the EU and 
US market size for bonds 
in 2008.
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DESIGNING A NATURAL 
CAPITAL BOND
With the promise of finance from REDD, 
tropical forest bonds are the frontrunner to be 
the first natural capital bond. Numerous 
organisation have started to explore how to 
design a forest bond, providing valuable 
lessons for natural capital bonds generally. The 
Prince’s Rainforests Project, highlighted four 
key elements in the design of a rainforest bond; 
credit risk, term or maturity, repayment 
schedule, and yield versus similar securities 
(The Prince’s Rainforests Project, 2009).
CREDIT RISK 
A natural capital bond would need to obtain the 
highest credit risk rating (AAA) from major 
credit rating agencies in order to access large 
pools of institutional investment capital. 
Institutions such as the World Bank and the IFC 
carry AAA-ratings, as do most developed 
country governments. A bond backed by such 
parties would therefore earn a similar rating. 
TERM 
Bonds are issued with anything from one-year 
to 40-year maturities. A natural capital bond 
would probably use a term of 10 or more 
years, because of the financing needs of natural 
capital and the likely demand from 
institutional investors. 
REPAYMENT SCHEDULE
Most bonds offer a fixed annual interest 
payment, or coupon, to investors. A Rainforest 
Bond could be designed to generate the type of 
repayment schedules that are most attractive to 
investors and to the governments backing it. 
The burden of interest payments can also be 
shifted across time by issuing multiple bonds 
and paying coupons out of a sinking fund.
YIELD 
A natural capital bond would need to offer 
investors a yield that is competitive to other 
AAA-rated fixed income securities. In 2006 the 
International Finance Facility for Immunisation 
(IFFIm) sold a US$1 billion bond (rated AAA) 
with an annual yield of 5.019%, 31 basis 
points above the benchmark five-year US 
Treasury bond. In 2007 the World Bank issued 
a €1.5 billion three-year bond that had a yield 
of 4.25%, five basis points above the 
underlying government benchmark.
Based on (Forum for the Future, 2009) and 
(The Prince’s Rainforests Project, 2009)
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: FROM 
THE “A” TO “BCD” 
Over the past two decades, the discourse on 
aid has evolved to focus on three critical and 
interrelated objectives. Halting global 
biodiversity loss is the core focus of the UN 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and 
encompasses conservation and sustainable use 
of ecosystems across a broad landscape of 
protected areas and human-affected 
landscapes. Climate change has been 
described as the greatest market failure the 
world has ever seen31. Enshrined under the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), 192 countries focus their efforts on 
ways to limit global warming and to adapt to the 
effects of climate change. In addition to these 
issues, international development is also 
concerned with ending poverty. The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which range from 
halving extreme poverty to providing universal 
primary education, all by the date of 2015 – are 
a blueprint on how to do that. 
Reaching each of these targets will require 
significant amounts of financing, most of which 
will need to be delivered in developing 
countries: IUCN is calling for OECD countries 
to contribute around USD 120 billion32 in 
international biodiversity assistance; the World 
Bank estimates that by 2030, developing 
countries will need an additional USD 280 
billion to mitigate and adapt to climate 
change33; and the UN Millennium Project 
estimates that – on top of the needs for 
ecosystem preservation and combating climate 
change – achieving the MDGs will require 
additional finance of USD 133 billion34 by 
2015. 
Even if we reach the Aid target of 0.7% of gross 
national income, achieving all of the targets for 
Biodiversity, Climate and Development in 
developing countries will require 2-3 times 
more. Whilst developing countries will be able 
to meet some of the challenge domestically, the 
significant international finance will still be 
needed. Meeting these goals is in interest of all 
nations and to achieve them will require the 
coordination of international finance in both the 
generation of revenue and the delivery of these 
funds. International mechanisms, such as the 
auctioning of allowances, a financial 
transaction tax and a tax on international 
aviation or shipping, have the potential to raise 
vast sums of finance and do not suffer from the 
revenue capture problems of domestic 
government financing or ODA (see page 46). 
Implementing them in a timely and effective 
manner, however, will require strong political 
will, and international coordination among the 
champions of biodiversity, climate change and 
development goals.
31. Attributed to Lord Nicolas Stern 
32. IUCN calls OECD countries to contribute at least 0.3% of their gross domestic product (GDP) in addition to the 0.7% ODA 
target (IUCN, 2010).
33. The World Development Report 2010 (World Bank, 2010) estimated needs in developing countries of 140-175 for mitigation 
and 30-100 for adaptation (2005 dollars). The mid-range values of these estimates were taken and inflated to 2010 dollars 
(inflation data from IMF, 2010). 
34. Needs for meeting MDGs were estimated to be USD 195 (2003 dollars) in 2015 (UN Millennium Project, 2005). That 
estimation specifically did not consider financing related to climate change and ecosystem preservation. The estimate was 
inflated (IMF, 2010) to USD 264 billion (2010 dollars) and compared to expected ODA of USD 130.6 billion in 2010 (OECD, 
2010; originally expressed as USD 126 billion in 2009 dollars. The shortfall is USD 133.3 billion (2010 dollars), which is 0.33% 
of OECD-DAC countries’ gross national income (GNI) in 2010, which when added to the current spending equal to 0.32% of that 
GNI, the total would be close to the 0.7% target. It is assumed that once reached, the 0.7% should be maintained, true to the 
long-standing goal.
AVIATION TAX OR LEVY
Several proposals have been put forward under international 
biodiversity, climate change and development discussions for a 
levy or tax on the aviation sector (Parker et al., 2009). Whilst these 
proposals all use different mechanisms to generate revenue, they 
all share one common feature; they are attempts to ‘internalise’ the 
environmental externality of carbon emissions from global 
aviation. Emissions from aviation are the fastest growing source of 
global emissions (Project Catalyst, 2009) and are currently 
excluded from any targets under the Kyoto Protocol. In addition to 
reducing emissions from this sector, placing a levy or a cap on 
aviation could generate between USD 2-20 billion annually 
(Parker et al., 2009). As discussed on page 79, international 
finance would be in competition with mitigation, adaptation and 
development goals. The estimate shown in the icon bar assumes 
that 25% of available finance would be allocated to biodiversity 
and ecosystem services.
The options that have been forward can be broken into three 
groups35. The first is an Emissions Trading Scheme. The second 
option would impose a tax or levy on airline passengers and such 
an approach has already been tried and tested in the French 
solidarity levy to combat HIV/AIDS. The final option would be to 
impose a tax on bunker fuels for refuelling planes.
Whilst the revenues generated for aviation are large the effect of 
these mechanisms on tourism would be relatively small (Project 
Catalyst, 2009). The global aviation industry has revenues of about 
USD 500 billion per year, so a levy of USD 20 billion on air 
transport would be equivalent to a price increase of 4%.
35. The options are not 
additive (i.e. only one of 
them could be 
implemented 
internationally).
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36. Taken from analysis 
by McKinsey and Co. 
(Project Catalyst, 2009) 
and the WRI CAIT 
database 
http:.//cait.wri.org
37. The options put 
forward are not additive 
(i.e. only one of them 
could be implemented 
internationally).
MARITIME TAX OR LEVY
Maritime emissions accounted for 2.2% of global CO2 emissions in 
2005 and are expected to rise by 50% by 202036. Currently these 
emissions are excluded from any international climate change 
agreement and several proposals have been put forward to 
internalise the emissions resulting from international shipping. 
Placing a cap or levy on maritime emissions would not only reduce 
emissions from this sector but it could also raise up to USD 32 
billion in international finance for biodiversity, climate change and 
development (see page 79). 
Three main proposals have been put forward to raise revenue for 
the international shipping sector (Parker et. al, 2009)37. The first is 
a global sectoral Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) for shipping. The 
second option would impose a 1% levy on maritime transport 
freight charges operated by developed countries and 0.1% levy on 
developing countries. The final option would be to impose a tax on 
bunker fuels for refuelling ships. As discussed on page 79, 
international finance would be in competition with mitigation, 
adaptation and development goals. The estimate shown in the icon 
bar assumes that 25% of available finance would be allocated to 
biodiversity and ecosystem services.
Whilst the mechanisms described above have the potential to raise 
significant finance they are unlikely to have an impact on global 
maritime trade (Project Catalyst, 2009). Around USD 12 trillion 
worth of goods were traded in 2008, of which about 80% was 
transported by sea so a USD 32 billion tariff on the maritime sector 
would be equivalent to less than ½% price increase.
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FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX (TOBIN TAX)
This mechanism, originally suggested by James Tobin, proposes a 
tax on wholesale currency transactions. The original purpose of 
the Tobin tax was to reduce foreign currency speculations 
(Harmeling et al., 2009). There is uncertainty within the 
literature, however, over whether such a tax would reduce or 
increase exchange rate volatility (UNFCCC, 2007).
The scale of revenue that could be generated through a financial 
transaction tax will depend on the tax rate and how the tax will be 
implemented (e.g. on all transactions or end-of-day open 
positions) and in the estimated change in trade volumes due to 
introduction of the tax (UNFCCC, 2007). There appears to be 
consensus within the literature that a tax rate of 0.1% or lower 
should be used to minimize the loss of liquidity and adverse 
impacts on the trade volume and market structure. 
The adoption of a financial transaction tax could generate between 
USD 30-35 billion using tax rates of 0.02%38. Although it is 
widely accepted that a financial transaction tax is technically 
feasible, there is uncertainty around how it could be implemented 
and enforced (UNFCCC, 2007) and the biggest challenge for this 
mechanism, will be reaching a political consensus 
(Nissanke, 2003).
38. The high and low 
estimates shown in the 
icon bar use tax rates of 
0.01% and 0.02% 
respectively assume that 
25% of available finance 
would be allocated to 
biodiversity and 
ecosystem finance (see 
page 79).
84
39. It would also be 
possible to use a much 
smaller levy across all 
policyholders to generate 
the same level of 
contribution.
LEVY ON INSURANCE PREMIUMS
A levy on insurance premiums is a new and innovative proposal to 
generate finance for biodiversity and ecosystems services. 
Ecosystems services and biodiversity play a vital role in our global 
economy (see page 18) and the loss of these services currently cost 
as much as USD 740 billion per annum and that cost will continue 
to increase if we continue to lose biodiversity and ecosystems at 
our current rate (Braat and ten Brink, 2009).
Given the high degree of dependence between man-made capital 
and natural capital, placing a tax or levy on insurance premiums to 
protect our biodiversity could prove a cost effective mechanism. 
An insurance levy has been proposed in various formats including 
a levy on the catastrophe element of insurance premiums to 
protect rainforests (The Prince’s Rainforests Project, 2009) but 
very few applications have emerged to date.
The scale of finance that could be generated through an insurance 
levy is difficult to predict and will depend on which markets are 
included and the level of taxation applied. Research carried out for 
the Prince’s Rainforests Project (PRP) suggests that a levy of 4.5% 
on the catastrophe element of insurance premiums would generate 
around USD 3.3 billion per annum 39.
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DELIVERY
UNDERSTANDING DELIVERY
The first chapter examined the different proposals for generating 
finance for biodiversity and ecosystems services; this second 
chapter explores the different options for delivering biodiversity 
finance in developing countries. As funds for biodiversity and 
ecosystems increase conservation and sustainable use, the 
international community will need appropriate financial 
instruments to deliver funding on the ground.
THE STATE OF PLAY
Public and private sector finance can use a variety of mechanisms 
including grants, debt and non-financial incentive to deliver 
financial resources; the choice of these instruments will depend on 
how and why the revenue is being delivered. Currently, finance is 
delivered through a fragmented approach with very little 
coordination at the international level outside the GEF. Under the 
CBD mandate, finance that is delivered through the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) is done so using unconditional grants 
(see page 102). 
A BRIEF HISTORY
Articles 21 and 20 of the Convention state the following regarding 
the delivery of financial resources:
“Article 21(1): There shall be a mechanism for the provision of 
financial resources to developing country Parties for purposes of 
this Convention (…). Voluntary contributions may also be made 
by the developed country Parties and by other countries and 
sources. The mechanism shall operate within a democratic and 
transparent system of governance.”
“Article 20(3): The developed country Parties may also provide, 
and developing countries avail themselves of, financial resources 
related to the implementation of this Convention through 
bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels.”
In addition, a set of processes is being used by Parties under the 
CBD to define and communicate national financing priorities for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, including the needs for 
establishing an ecologically representative network of 
protected areas.
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National Biodiversity Strategies and Action 
Plans (NBSAPs) 
Article 6 of the Convention states that each Contracting Party 
shall, in accordance with its particular conditions and capabilities 
develop national strategies, plans or programmes for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. To date, 
170 Parties to the CBD (88%) have developed National Biodiversity 
Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) or equivalent instruments, 
and 14 more have them under preparation. Some Parties are also 
developing biodiversity strategies and/or action plans at the 
sub-national level.
Ecological gap analyses under the PoWPA
The CBD Programme of Work on Protected Areas (PoWPA)1, 
adopted at COP 7 in 2004 Decision VII/28, is the most 
comprehensive plan of action for the development of participatory, 
ecologically representative and effectively managed national and 
regional systems of protected areas, integrating other land uses 
and contributing to human well-being. Parties were guided to 
begin this process by completing a gap analysis of their protected 
area systems with the full and effective participation of indigenous 
and local communities and relevant stakeholders by the end of 
2006. Through their national gap analyses, which have been in 
large part supported by UNDP and the GEF, countries identified 
high priority areas to expand or improve their protected 
area networks.
National and subnational gap analyses are an essential step in the 
implementation of protected areas and might also serve as a useful 
tool for other UN conventions. It has been suggested that to 
facilitate early action on REDD, and to avoid duplication of effort, 
data already accrued for many developing countries within the 
CBD can be used to determine the best locations to deliver REDD 
finance (CBD, 2009).
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1. For more information, 
visit www.cbd.int/
protected
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DELIVERY FRAMEWORK
CRITERIA
The diagram below presents a framework that can be used to 
analyse and understand the different options for the delivery 
of biodiversity finance.  The framework comprises four criteria 
as follows:
Level: At what level will revenue be delivered? 
Participation: Which countries can participate? 
Theme: What activities can be financed? 
Performance-based: Is the provision of funding linked 
to performance?
Using the above framework allows us to compare individual 
options and to collectively see areas of convergence or divergence. 
The following pages provide an explanation of these criteria and 
how they can be used to understand proposals for the delivery of 
biodiversity finance.
A further consideration for the delivery of finance is how much 
finance can be leveraged from other mechanisms and how much 
biodiversity is delivered per unit cost; i.e. its efficiency (see page 
96). These considerations, although not visually represented with 
an icon, are discussed for each mechanism.
The following pages provide an explanation of these criteria and 
how they can be used to understand proposals for the delivery of 
biodiversity finance.
Figure 7. A framework 
for understanding 
delivery proposals
EFFECTIVE / EFFICIENT
LEVEL
At what level (project or programmatic) 
is finance likely to be delivered?
 
PERFORMANCE BASED
Is the provision of funding linked to 
emission reduction performance?
PRINCIPLE 
CRITERION 
EQUITABLE
PARTICIPATION
Which countries are most 
likely to participate?
APPROPRIATE
THEME 
What type of activities are 
appropriate for this particular 
funding mechanism?
DELIVERY
LEVEL
The administrative level at which finance for biodiversity and 
ecosystem services is delivered is an important consideration for 
developing countries.
Options: National, Project
Finance for biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services 
provision can be delivered either at the project or the national 
level. Project-level mechanisms can deliver finance to both 
public and private entities for the implementation of individual 
activities within a specific location and timeframe, whereas 
national-level delivery mechanisms provide funding for 
longer-term coordinated planning that typically involves the 
integration of financial resources into the budget of the recipient 
country, using the government’s existing financial architecture. 
The level at which finance is delivered will have important 
implications for both the effectiveness - in terms of coverage 
achieved, reduced risk of leakage, country ownership, and 
coordination with ongoing national development plans - and 
efficiency of ecosystem finance. National-level delivery 
mechanisms are more likely to achieve economies of scale and are 
often associated with reduced transaction costs to both 
contributors and recipients (Schneider and Cames, 2009). 
Contributing countries are often unwilling, though, to deliver 
pooled funding at the national level because of concerns of 
fiduciary responsibilities related to larger scale funding 
incorporated into the recipient country’s national budget. 
Project-level finance on the other hand can often be better 
evaluated than national approaches and might also be the most 
appropriate for certain biodiversity and ecosystem service 
interventions, particularly those that require immediate and 
urgent action or those that capture a direct local benefit to users. 
Finally, project-based finance may be more appropriate for 
countries lacking the institutional capacity to apply national level 
approaches to finance biodiversity (see the Participation criterion 
on page 91).
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PARTICIPATION
This criterion aims to identify the types of countries that are most 
likely to benefit from a given delivery mechanism. 
Options: Least Developed Countries, Developing 
Countries, Developed Countries
Due to issues of capacity and governance, the ability to participate 
in a given mechanism will vary between lower, middle and higher 
income countries. This criterion uses three groups of countries to 
define the level of participation: least developed countries 
(LDCs) are a group of countries recognised by the UN as having the 
lowest performance on indicators of income, human development 
and economic vulnerability2; developing countries are those 
countries that are not ‘least developed’ within the group of 
developing countries defined under the UN3; the final category, 
developed countries, are the developed market economies 
defined under the UN (see footnote 4).
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NATIONAL PROJECT
2. A list of the least 
developed countries is 
available at http://www.
unohrlls.org/en/ldc/
related/62/
3. Taken from the List of 
Country Groupings and 
Sub-groupings for the 
Analytical Studies of the 
United Nations World 
Economic Survey and 
other UN Reports 
accessible at http://
unpan1.un.org/intradoc/
groups/public/
documents/un/
unpan008092.pdf
LEAST DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES 
DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
ADVANCED DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES 
94 95
CASE STUDY
THE BOLSA FLORESTA
The Bolsa Floresta Programme, in the Brazilian 
state of Amazonas, is a voluntary programme to 
reduce deforestation and promote sustainable 
development by rewarding the communities of 
the Amazon for its conservation. The 
programme was established in 2007 by the 
Government of the State of Amazonas, through 
its Secretariat for Environment and Sustainable 
Development, and is implemented by the 
Amazonas Sustainable Foundation5 (Fundação 
Amazonas Sustentáve; FAS) – an independent 
and non-profit NGO. 
The Bolsa Floresta Program has four main 
components that support forest-friendly 
livelihoods and provide incentives for continued 
forest preservation:
• The Bolsa Floresta Income supports  
sustainable production of non-timber 
forest products (NTFP) such as nuts, 
fruits, vegetable oils, wood, honey, fish 
and others. The goal of the Income 
programme is to improve the efficiency 
of production chains, thus allowing 
more value to flow to the producer. All 
activities that do not lead to 
deforestation are eligible for this 
component.
• The Bolsa Floresta Social supports 
infrastructure improvements related to 
education, health, communication and 
transportation. The activities and projects 
are developed in partnership with 
government agencies and NGOs. The goal 
of the Social programme is to break the 
cycle of deforestation by providing key 
services that would otherwise be financed 
4. An exchange rate of BRL 2 to USD 1 has been used throughout.
by converting tropical forests to other uses.
• The Bolsa Floresta Family is a monthly 
payment of USD 25 per month4 to the 
mothers of families that live in protected 
areas that agree to a zero deforestation 
goal. The payment is not intended to be the 
main source of household income, but is 
a supplement to reward households for 
forest conservation and provision of 
ecosystem services.
• The Bolsa Floresta Association aims to 
strengthen community-based organizations 
in the region. It provides additional 
financial support equivalent to 10% of 
the amount paid to all families registered 
in Bolsa Floresta Family in each 
protected area.
GENERATION OF FINANCE
The long-term financial sustainability of the 
Bolsa Floresta Program is guaranteed by an 
endowment fund of around USD 32 million, 
managed by FAS. The fund was established 
using grants from three major donors 
(Government of the State of Amazonas, 
Bradesco Bank and Coca-Cola Brazil). FAS 
uses the interest from the fund to pay for the 
Family component. In 2009, the Bolsa Floresta 
program also received USD 10 million from the 
Amazon Fund which it will earmark to finance 
the execution of the Income and Association 
components. It is estimated that this will 
benefit approximately 10,000 families across 
10 million hectares of state protected areas.
DELIVERY OF FINANCE
The Family component of the Bolsa Floresta 
Programme currently delivers funds through 
unconditional grants (see page 102) from an 
endowment fund managed by FAS.  Grants are 
delivered to the mother of each household - as 
mothers are often better at managing savings 
and are more likely to use the funds 
appropriately. Payments are delivered directly 
to the bank account of individual families 
registered in the program. The mothers have a 
bank card, which they can then use when they 
go to towns or cities. 
The Association component, which provides a 
payment of an equivalent to 10% of the amount 
paid to all households thought the Family 
component (an average of USD 30,000 per 
year) into the Protected Area and is delivered to 
the Association by annual work plans.
Finance under the Income component, will be 
delivered to communities across 15 Protected 
Areas under the Programme to enhance the 
effectiveness of their economic activities. An 
estimated USD 70,000 per Protected Area per 
year has been set aside for this purpose.
The Social component uses non-financial 
incentives to deliver finance through 
infrastructure projects such as schools, 
hospitals and transport networks. 
It is important to mention that all the 
investments made in the Protected Areas 
are made in a participatory manner affix 
through local workshops, where FAS staff 
provides methodological assistance and 
facilitation and community members make 
investment decisions.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The governance of the Bolsa Floresta 
Programme is designed to ensure credibility, 
transparency and participation. The 
management of the programme including 
management of the fund is coordinated by FAS, 
which has a board of directors from various 
representative segments of society 
(government, business, scientific, social and 
environmental) and a president. Accounting 
and audit for the programme are performed by 
third party organisations and statements of 
accounts are regularly forwarded to the 
District Attorney.
Virgilio Viana , João Tezza , Gabriel Ribenboim  
and Thais Megid Pinto , FAS
http://www.fas-amazonas.org/en/secao/
forest-allowance-program
THEME
The theme criterion outlines the activities that would be 
appropriate to receive finance under a given delivery mechanism.
Options: Conservation, Sustainable use, Capacity 
building, Technology transfer
Different activities for biodiversity conservation and ecosystem 
service provision have varying financial needs and economic 
returns, and therefore certain types of delivery mechanism may 
be better suited to certain types of activities. Biodiversity and 
ecosystem service interventions can be grouped into four themes:
Conservation activities are defined here as activities that have 
limited (if any) extractive use of the natural capital (e.g. protected 
areas). In the introduction we outlined the different flows that are 
provided by natural capital (see page 16). The conservation theme 
refers to activities that are focused more on delivering ecosystem 
services and restrict the use of ecosystem goods. 
Sustainable use focuses on the provision of ecosystem goods, 
but in such a manner that the provision of ecosystem services and 
conservation of biodiversity are maintained at high levels (e.g. 
agroforestry). These types of activities are useful for areas where 
humans have a significant impact on the landscape, such as buffer 
zones around PAs.
Capacity building activities focus on supporting countries and 
communities in their ability to carry out the protection of 
biodiversity and provision of ecosystem services. It can include 
activities that support improved governance of PAs, market 
development for green commodities (see page 75), formalising land 
tenure, and policy reform. 
Technology transfer refers to the improvement of technical 
knowledge related to ecosystem conservation and the sustainable 
use of natural capital and genetic resources. That includes, for 
example, scientific knowledge for improving the design of PAs or 
optimising agroforestry production systems. It also includes, 
more tangible technology transfer, such as systems for tracking 
illegal timber.
CONSERVATION
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PERFORMANCE BASEDPERFORMANCE-BASED
This criterion answers the question of whether or not the provision 
of funding is based on performance related to biodiversity 
conservation and ecosystem service provision.
Options: Performance-based, Non-Performance-based
To a certain degree, all delivery mechanisms are related to 
performance in the sense that there is an expected output from 
funding (for example, grants given in support of capacity building 
activities are based on the expected result that capacity will be 
built). Performance-based delivery as discussed here, however, 
means that delivery of finance is conditional upon the already 
executed or expected delivery of ecosystem services or biodiversity 
conservation. Although payments were the original mechanism to 
deliver performance-based ecosystem finance (see “performance-
based grants” on page 103), most delivery mechanisms can be 
designed to be conditional (see “What are PES?” on page 24).
A major question related to conditionality is whether performance 
is measured indirectly, based on activities that are believed to 
improve biodiversity conservation and ecosystem service 
provision (e.g. hectares of habitat reforested at the project level; or 
success of PA policy reform at the national level), or directly, based 
on the measurement of actual services delivered (e.g. number of 
marine turtle hatchlings or tonnes of carbon sequestered). The 
latter is considered more economically efficient to deliver a specific 
ecosystem service, but is narrow in scope and may crowd-out 
concern for other ecosystem services (e.g. concern over climate 
change crowding out concerns for biodiversity; CBD, 2010). On the 
other hand, the success of indirect performance measures is 
dependent on the strength of the relationship between the activity 
measured and the level of biodiversity conservation and ecosystem 
service provision.
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7. National level 
mechanisms encompass 
both programmatic and 
sectoral mechanisms. 
 
8. See the Little REDD 
Book for a summary and 
further information  
on the Nested Approach 
(Parker, 2008).
9. This criterion 
applies solely to financing 
mitigation activities.
SUSTAINABLE USE
CAPACITY BUILDINGS
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
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IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF 
ECOSYSTEM FINANCE
Efficiency can generally be interpreted in two 
ways: either in terms of a mechanisms ability to 
leverage additional forms of finance for 
biodiversity and ecosystems; or in terms of how 
much biodiversity is conserved (or ecosystem 
service provided) per unit cost (economic 
efficiency). Whilst these two concepts are 
important considerations for the generation of 
ecosystem finance, they are of particular 
importance for the delivery and institutional 
arrangement of finance. 
LEVERAGE
The most commonly understood definition of 
leverage is the ability to encourage or raise 
private sector finance and typically applies to 
public financing mechanisms (UNEP, 2008)5.  
A key question for public finance, therefore, is 
how much private finance can be mobilised by 
a given amount of public money. Leverage can 
also be defined as the ability to use resources 
above and beyond the initial investment, e.g. 
through the use of a revolving fund, whereby 
concessional loans are repaid and re-lent.  
Financial risk mitigation instruments, such as 
debt guarantees, also offer considerable 
financial leveragability.
EFFICIENCY
Efficiency is generally referred to in terms of 
output per unit cost and refers to the ability to 
get more of a desired result per dollar spent.  
As experience grows in the use of different 
delivery mechanisms, so does understanding of 
the relative efficiency of these tools.
5. Leverage can also be applied to private mechanisms, for example, the presence of a shade grown coffee company in an area 
might attract additional finance from a forest conservation project.
6. Rents are the profits that accrue from the difference in price between the marginal abatement cost (MAC) in developing 
countries and the market price for carbon (which should be the MAC in developed countries).
In the context of market-based mechanisms, 
efficiency can be viewed in two ways.  Various 
environmental markets, including the Clean 
Development Mechanism under the UNFCCC, 
have shown us that markets tend towards 
options that deliver the most output (in this 
case emissions reductions) per unit cost, the 
so-called ‘low-hanging fruit’.  In this context 
markets can be described as being efficient, as 
conservation is achieved at the lowest cost.  
From another perspective, however, markets 
can be viewed as being inefficient.  Project 
level markets are often attractive to the private 
sector because they can accrue rents6.  Under 
this type of mechanism, therefore, a market 
would fail to maximise abatement potential and 
would be inefficient.  Several proposals have 
been put forward including reverse auctions 
and sectoral mechanisms that aim to overcome 
inefficiencies in project-based mechanisms 
(Parker et al., 2009).
Non-market mechanisms may also have 
different degrees of efficiency.  For example, 
performance-based grants (see page 103) in 
certain cases might be more efficient that 
unconditional grants (page 102), and 
concessional loans (page 104) that use a 
revolving fund could improve efficiency over 
other forms of concessional finance.
CASE STUDY
COLOMBIA’S BIODIVERSITY 
FINANCING ROUNDTABLES
Financing roundtables have been widely 
recognised as a useful approach to enable 
multiple donor partners to meet, discuss 
financing needs, and coordinate their support, 
based on national priorities. These roundtables 
serve to promote and organise counterpart 
financing for biodiversity-related activities.
In June 2010, the Government of Colombia7, in 
collaboration with the CBD Secretariat’s 
LifeWeb Initiative (see page 136), hosted a 
biodiversity financing roundtable. In line with 
the CBD Programme of Work on Protected 
Areas the roundtable aimed to foster 
coordination in the establishment and 
maintenance of a national system of protected 
areas in Colombia. Specifically, the roundtable 
served as a forum to examine the needs of and 
improve cooperation on financing the protected 
area network in Colombia. 
The roundtable was attended by governments 
of nine international cooperation partners, the 
Colombian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Environment, and the Department of National 
Planning, as well as three NGOs. Those present 
conveyed the desire for this forum to become 
an ongoing process to facilitate financial 
cooperation for ecosystem-based approaches 
to sustain biodiversity, address climate change, 
and secure livelihoods.
7. Through the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation and National Parks of Colombia
DELIVERY 
PROPOSALS
A GUIDE TO DELIVERY PROPOSALS
The following pages present a guide to seven mechanisms to 
deliver finance for biodiversity and ecosystem services. Each 
proposal is analysed using the framework presented above and is 
represented graphically using the icons shown overleaf. These 
icons represent the main options from the analytical framework, 
and have been grouped into their respective criteria.
The icons will be presented to the side of each proposal in an ‘icon 
bar’ shown here on the left. Not all proposals aim to define all of the 
criteria of the framework. To simplify matters, all icons in the icon 
bar will be greyed out by default and only the options that are 
explicitly relevant to each mechanism will be highlighted in colour.
For example the ‘icon bar’ shown on the left indicates that the 
delivery of finance in this hypothetical delivery mechanism would 
be appropriate for sustainable use and conservation activities at 
the national level, would be performance based, and least 
developed countries would not be able to participate easily.
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UNCONDITIONAL GRANTS
A grant is defined as a transfer made in cash, goods or services 
for which no repayment is required (OECD, 2009). Given the 
difficulties in capturing the benefits of biodiversity and ecosystem 
services as global public goods, a substantial portion of ecosystem 
finance includes grant payments. While grants could be used for 
a wide variety of biodiversity needs, financial resources that are 
delivered as grants are likely to be limited, so their use should 
be targeted.
Grants are typically targeted towards activities that provide a 
public good that has no (or negative) financial returns for the 
recipient. Grants are therefore, primarily used for conservation 
activities (i.e. protected areas), capacity building (including policy 
reform) and technology transfer8. Because of this, grants will play 
a role within all countries, but will be particularly important to the 
LDCs that may need finance primarily for capacity building 
activities. Close monitoring of the use of grants in poor and badly 
governed countries is needed, however, as grants can have a 
negative effect on domestic revenue generation in those countries 
(Odedokun, 2003).
Grants can create significant financial leverage if used for technical 
assistance as they can help to stimulate other financial flows. The 
GEF, for example, has an average leverage effect of 1:4 over all focal 
areas (Pearce, 2004) and 1:3 for the biodiversity focal area (CBD, 
2010a). Whilst grants can be delivered at either the national or 
project level, the delivery of public finance at the national level is 
preferred, as it allows integration with national development goals 
and other forms of revenue.
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PERFORMANCE BASED PAYMENTS
Performance-based payments are conditional monetary transfers 
for the provision of ecologically sustainable behaviour. 
Performance-based payments have emerged as a relatively simple 
method to directly and conditionally incentivise sustainable 
land-use practices.  Payments are awarded based on three types 
of conditionality: either directly ex post for a unit of ecosystem 
service or biodiversity verifiably provided (e.g. payments for 
tonnes of carbon sequestered), directly ex ante for a proxy to 
ecosystem service or biodiversity provision (e.g. hectares of forest 
conserved), or indirectly for the implementation of policies and 
measures that protect ecosystems (e.g. payments to enact stricter 
laws against timber extraction). As discussed when describing the 
“performance-based” criterion (page 95), the relative efficiency of 
the latter two approaches depends on the strength of the 
relationship between the proxy measure or policies implemented 
and the level of ecosystem service or biodiversity that those 
actions provide.
Performance-based payments can be implemented at either the 
project level or the national level. At the project level, they are most 
often referred to as payments for ecosystem services (PES), which 
have become popular in recent years. National level performance-
based payments are now gaining momentum within international 
policy, especially through the discussions on financial incentives 
for REDD. The Norwegian government, for example, has recently 
pledged USD 1 billion for Indonesia to implement a national 
strategy to reduce emissions through a moratorium on 
logging concessions9.
The effectiveness of performance-based payments will depend on 
the establishment of credible baselines, understanding the costs of 
implementation, customising payments to local dynamics, and 
targeting agents with credible land claims and clear threats to 
conservation (Wunder, 2006). At the project level, this means only 
paying local actors that can best affect conservation objectives and 
differentiating payments among those who are most likely to 
deliver conservation benefits. In practice, though, differentiating 
payments may be difficult to implement due to concerns over 
equity in delivery.
8. The Global 
Environment Facility 
(GEF), which delivers all 
of its finance through 
unconditional grants, has 
four key objectives; the 
first objective aims to 
support protected areas, 
the second targets the 
incremental costs of 
mainstreaming 
biodiversity in the private 
sector and the final two 
objectives directly aim 
to build capacity 
(see page 42).
9. See Annex IX 
of non-paper No. 54 for 
the recent submission  
by US for a ‘Global Fund 
for Climate’ available  
at http://unfccc.int/ 
files/kyoto_protocol/
application/pdf/ 
54fin61109.pdf
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NATIONAL CONCESSIONAL DEBT
International public finance can also be delivered through 
concessional loans (or concessional debt) to governments or public 
private partnerships. Debt mechanisms involve a transfer of 
finance from donors to recipients for which repayment by the 
recipient is required10. Public finance loans for ecosystem 
protection or ecosystem-friendly activities could be delivered at 
more favourable rates than private sector debt. These loans are 
referred to as concessional or ‘soft’ loans.
There are two ways in which concessional loans can be used to 
finance biodiversity and ecosystem services. Concessional debt 
can either be simply directed towards ecosystem-friendly 
activities, or concessionality can be conditional on the provision 
of ecosystem services or biodiversity (i.e. lower interest rates 
would be the reward for the conservation or sustainable use of 
natural capital)11. 
Although a robust economic appraisal of the effectiveness of loans 
in delivering environmental objectives has not been carried out, 
many lessons can be drawn from the use of concessional loans in 
the delivery of ODA. Concessional loans for development have been 
most suitable for investments that have some level of financial 
return, while still being below a threshold that would attract 
commercial investment (Parker et al., 2009). As such, concessional 
loans could be used to support projects in nascent biodiversity and 
ecosystem service markets (direct or indirect as defined in the 
Generation chapter) where financial returns are low.
The use of concessional debt achieves both cost-efficiency and 
financial leverage as the initial public investment is likely to reduce 
the investment risks for private finance. Further, some portion of 
the resources will be repaid, allowing them to be recycled for other 
purposes. The use of concessional loans will have implications for 
least developed countries. Loans require a certain level of 
institutional capacity to manage repayments, and are therefore 
better suited to countries that have higher GDP, lower levels of 
debt, and lower risks of economic volatility (Parker et al., 2009).
10. The repayment will 
be of the initial loan 
(called the principal) and 
any interest accrued over 
a fixed period of 
instalments.
11. Depending on the 
level of conditionality the 
interest rates for 
concessional debt can be 
zero, or even negative. At 
the extreme, a loan could 
be convertible to a grant 
if the contractual 
conditions for the 
provision of ecosystem 
preservation are met (see 
page 103 for a 
project-level example).
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CASE STUDY
BIO-RIGHTS: CONVERTIBLE MICRO-
CREDITS IN INDONESIA
In the 1970s and 80s, expansion of 
unsustainable aquaculture in the coastal areas 
of central Java and North Sumatra caused 
large-scale mangrove degradation resulting in 
biodiversity loss, collapse of fisheries and 
erosion. It also increased the vulnerability of 
coastal areas to storm surges, for example, 
allowing ecosystems in Sumatra to suffer 
significant additional damage as a result of the 
2004 tsunami. The dwindling natural resource 
base has led to increased poverty, while 
mounting pressure on the remaining resources 
results in further overexploitation to meet 
short-term needs. 
Wetlands International tried to resolve this 
vicious cycle by implementing Bio-rights 
initiatives with over 70 community groups, 
working in close collaboration with local NGOs 
and CBOs. The Bio-rights approach provides 
local community groups with access to 
microcredit to develop alternative, sustainable 
livelihoods in return for the provision of 
ecosystem services and/or biodiversity 
conservation. Community groups may be 
required, for example, to restore degraded 
ecosystems or control previously unsustainable 
resource exploitation. Upon successful 
fulfillment of a group’s obligations, the 
microcredit becomes 100% concessional and 
is converted into a payment. 
When implementing Bio-Rights in Indonesia, 
groups of 20-30 people were established and 
multi-stakeholder dialogues were initiated to 
discuss options for sustainable community 
development and ecosystem restoration. These 
dialogues allowed communities to share their 
immediate development priorities while raising 
local awareness of the importance of 
sustainable natural resource management. 
Based on these discussions, Bio-rights 
agreements were negotiated, detailing 
community-based restoration measures, 
sustainable development activities and 
indicators of success. The contractual 
obligation for conversion of credit was usually 
planting mangroves with a seedling survival rate 
over 70% after 2-3 years. 
In Indonesia, Bio-rights agreements have been 
used to plant over 1500 hectares of mangroves 
along the edges of aquaculture ponds and as 
protective belts along the coastline. The 
finance provided was used by communities to 
develop a range of sustainable development 
activities including goat farming, crab breeding, 
seaweed cultivation and other small 
enterprises. Nearly all communities met their 
contractual obligations, leading to the 
conversion of microcredit into payments. 
Several years after the project, community 
livelihoods have significantly improved: erosion 
control and storm protection functions of 
restored mangroves has significantly reduced 
vulnerability to extreme events, while local 
incomes have been directly boosted by 
improved fish and shrimp stocks and increased 
fuelwood and fodder supplies. Including the 
additional resources generated by the 
development activities, some communities 
have experienced as much as a threefold rise 
in incomes.
Pieter van Eijk, Marcel Silvius and Nyoman 
Suriadiputra. Wetlands International
www.wetlands.org/biorights
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MICROFINANCE
Microfinance12 is the provision of financial services (lending, 
savings and insurance) to poorer households and communities or 
small- and medium-sized enterprises that lack access to formal 
financial institutions. Microcredit currently provides the best-
developed microfinance mechanism for delivering ecosystem 
finance and so is the focus here. Microcredit involves offering 
small loans to groups or individuals to help build up their assets, 
establish or develop a business or protect against risks (Agrawala 
and Carraro, 2010).
Lack of financing is often a major hurdle for poorer communities to 
transition to more sustainable livelihoods. By financing that 
transition rather than paying for provision of ecosystem services, 
it is hoped that once financing stops, reconversion to unsustainable 
activities is less likely. Payments can be used to finance transition 
costs, but where some financial returns can be expected from the 
transition, microfinance may be a more efficient mechanism to 
deliver ecosystem finance.
As with national concessional debt, Microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) can either choose to selectively support sustainable and 
biodiversity-friendly enterprises (such as eco-tourism and green 
commodity production)13 or incorporate a level of environmental 
conditionality on lending. Conditionality can be implemented in 
two ways; either by incorporating conditions for future lending 
based on current ecosystem preservation (as discussed under 
‘Environmental mortgages’ on page 107) or by accepting lower 
repayment when borrowers carry out specified ecosystem 
preservation activities (as with national concessional debt, see 
page 104). At the extreme, microcredit could be 100% concessional 
and converted to a payment when the conditionality is met (see the 
case study on Bio-rights on page 105). 
Whichever model is used microfinance, if applied correctly, 
achieves both cost-efficiency and financial leverage. The use of 
microfinance may, however, require complementary grant-based 
finance (particularly in developing and least developed countries) 
to ensure that household and community borrowers have access to 
profitable markets and repayment is not overly burdensome.
12. Microfinance is 
broadly used here to 
discuss both micro- and 
meso-finance.
13. A few funds 
supported by NGOs and 
IGOs such as Verde 
Ventures (Conservation 
International) and 
Proyecto CAMBIO 
(Central American Bank 
for Economic 
Integration, United 
Nations Development 
Program, and Global 
Environment Facility) 
have already been 
established along 
these lines
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CASE STUDY
ENVIRONMENTAL MORTGAGES FOR 
MARINE TURTLE CONSERVATION
Marine turtles suffer from a suite of human 
impacts. As such, these species are highly 
endangered; loggerhead turtles, for example, 
may be extinct in 50 years. Some governments 
have taken steps to minimise impacts on 
marine turtles through command and control 
approaches limiting coastal development and 
regulating fisheries, at some cost to the public 
and private sectors. The efficacy of these 
conservation actions can be compromised, 
however, by other activities like the direct 
harvest of eggs and adults for subsistence 
domestically and sale in foreign markets. That 
threat is particularly acute in coastal 
communities where there are few alternative 
sources of income. 
Where direct regulation of unsustainable 
activities is likely to be ineffective due to local 
economic pressures, the primary question is 
how to overcome the lack of alternative 
livelihoods and reduce the unsustainable 
resource use that results from it. One 
possibility would be to use an “environmental 
mortgage” approach. An environmental 
mortgage programme would establish a 
community conservation lending trust. 
Community members could qualify for low 
interest lines of credit provided by the trust, 
with the total credit available conditionally 
linked to preservation of some environmental 
asset. In the case of coastal communities 
harvesting sea turtles, the credit available 
would depend on the annual number of sea 
turtle hatchlings (i.e. a direct ex-post 
conditionality, see page 95 and 103). Loans 
could be used for a range of pre-approved 
ventures, from improved agricultural 
production on existing cultivated lands to 
alternative economic activities to infrastructure 
improvements in order to improve market 
access. 
Given the success of microfinance institutions 
in alleviating poverty over the past two 
decades, environmental mortgages provide a 
promising approach for linking sustainable 
development and incentives for environmental 
stewardship. Today, environmental assets are 
often valued solely for their extractive uses, and 
much of that extraction is unsustainable, often 
due to a lack of alternatives. If challenges in 
design and implementation can be overcome, 
environmental mortgages would capitalise the 
value of conserving environmental assets, and 
provide not only the incentive, but also the 
means for low-impact livelihoods and 
development. 
C. Josh Donlan, Advanced Conservation 
Strategies
www.advancedconservation.org
For more information see Mandel, J., C. J. 
Donlan, C. Wilcox, R. Cudney-Bueno, S. 
Pascoe, and D. Tulchin. 2009. Debt investment 
as a tool for value transfer in biodiversity 
conservation Conservation Letters 2:233-239  
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NON-FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
Non-financial incentives reward ecosystem-friendly behaviour by 
offering non-financial benefits (e.g. strengthening of property 
rights) or specific in-kind payments (i.e. a local school). They can 
be unconditional, but are usually to some degree conditional on 
biodiversity conservation or ecosystem service provision.
While cash payments are theoretically preferred in situations 
where providers forgo income to deliver ecosystem services, in 
cases where they have been implemented the benefits from cash 
payments are often ‘insignificant’ (Porras et al., 2008) or do not 
overcome opportunity costs (Wunder, 2005, Kosoy et al., 2007). In 
contrast, non-financial benefits are believed to be a key reason for 
participating in PES schemes. For example, strengthening 
property rights, capacity building, and improvements in social 
organisation and quality of life are often cited as motivating 
participation in payments for watershed services 
(Porras et al., 2008).
Cash payments are also traditionally preferred because money is 
considered to be flexible. But where absorptive capacity is an issue 
in-kind payments are a more rational choice (Asquith et al., 2008). 
Without these financial options, there is higher risk that cash will 
be spent on non-necessary consumption (e.g. alcohol or other 
luxury goods). Although that occurrence is context-dependent, 
some ecosystem service providers themselves echo this sentiment 
and prefer receiving non-financial incentives For example, in 
designing the Los Negros watershed programme (see page 109), 
future recipients of payments were concerned that cash did not 
provide a lasting benefit (Robertson and Wunder, 2005).
There are also psychological benefits to non-financial incentives. 
Payments can crowd-out already existing altruistic or cultural 
motivations for providing ecosystem services (Farley and 
Costanza, 2010); they may also be viewed as entitlements over time 
thus diminishing their ability to incentivise (Sommerville et al., 
2009); and can cause fears of land expropriation (Robertson and 
Wunder, 2005). The decision between financial and non-financial 
incentives is highly context-specific, however,  and so ecosystem 
service buyers must investigate in advance the mode of incentives 
local people prefer (Wunder, 2005).
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CASE STUDY
PAYMENTS FOR WATERSHED 
SERVICES IN LOS NEGROS, BOLIVIA
Agriculture is a key activity in the Los Negros 
River region of Bolivia and heavily relies on 
irrigation from the river due to the semi-arid 
climate of the area. Since the late 1980s, the 
downstream agricultural zone experienced a 
50% reduction in water levels, attributed by 
downstream farmers to increased upriver water 
use and deforestation at the headwaters. To 
support restoration of water levels, Fundación 
Natura Bolivia developed a payment for 
watershed services (PWS) programme to 
compensate upstream farmers to conserve 
forest. Not only does this provide watershed 
services, but also delivers biodiversity 
conservation as the watershed borders the 
Amboró National Park. 
Based on the preferences of upstream farmers 
(who receive payments) the programme uses 
non-financial incentives in the form of artificial 
beehives (as well as technical training in many 
cases) instead of cash payments. Through a 
process of stakeholder engagement several key 
lessons were learnt on the design and use of 
non-financial incentives instead of (or to 
complement) cash payments. 
Firstly, it was considered important that the 
incentive provide long-run benefits either in the 
form of social benefits (such as schools or 
infrastructure) or by supporting alternative 
livelihoods. In both cases, but particularly in 
the case of alternative livelihoods, the incentive 
should help produce a genuinely marketable 
product and the livelihood should preferably 
depend on, or at least permit, ecosystem 
service co-production. Apiculture (bee keeping) 
was an appropriate alternative livelihood 
because it produces honey (a locally useful 
subsistence product) and incentivises forest 
conservation to protect bee habitat (ecosystem 
co-production). 
Another crucial consideration in incentive 
design was strengthening land tenure claims. 
Improving property rights is often cited as a 
reason for participation in PWS schemes. In 
the case of Los Negros, the inclusion of land 
as part of the scheme strengthens the idea it is 
being used and is owned by someone. Some 
participants have even suggested changing the 
in-kind payment from beehives to barbed wire, 
or some other support for delineating their 
land claim. 
Finally, in relation to delivery of the incentive, 
the Los Negros experience highlights three 
important points: firstly, training costs must be 
considered in the budgeting of the scheme and 
incentive design. This is important for any 
scheme that requires alternative land uses, but 
particularly important for in-kind payments that 
provide new equipment technologies for 
alternative livelihoods; secondly, the incentive 
should be as flexible as possible to meet 
participants’ needs; and finally where the 
incentive is in part an alternative livelihood, 
access to markets and market creation for 
new products arising from this livelihood will 
allow the new livelihood to be adopted 
more effectively. 
For more information see Asquith et al., 2008 
or go to www.naturabolivia.org
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POSITIVE TAX INCENTIVES
Governments can use positive tax incentives (specifically tax 
credits and tax exemptions) to promote ecosystem-friendly 
behaviour among businesses and land users. Positive tax 
incentives use domestic policy to deliver finance directly from a 
government’s budget. Biodiversity-related tax credits and 
exemptions would therefore likely be most politically feasible if 
the revenue for tax incentives were generated by an ecosystem-
focused revenue generation mechanism  (direct or linked as 
described in the Generation section).
Positive tax incentives take many forms and are found in a range 
of jurisdictions but are still not used to their potential (TEEB, 
2009b). They are most commonly used to reward landowners 
that currently undertake biodiversity conservation or forgo future 
development in order to safeguard habitats (i.e. conservation 
easements). But positive tax incentives are not limited to 
rewarding sustainable land use, they can also reward ecosystem-
friendly behaviour by businesses and investors.
Whilst revenue generation mechanisms that negatively incentivise 
biodiversity impacts (e.g. subsidy reform and natural capital taxes) 
are politically difficult to implement (OECD, 2005), positive 
incentives such as tax credits are more politically palatable. 
In general, however, it is preferable to tax negative impacts rather 
than subsidise preferable outcomes as there might be a tendency 
for companies or land users - who would have changed practices 
without the additional incentive - to take advantage of financial 
support (Stern, 2006).
Depending on the level at which incentives are set, positive tax 
incentives can leverage additional finance from personal values 
held by landowners (Boyd et al., 1999) or in the case of business 
directly from the private sector. More information is required, 
however, on the environmental impacts of such measures to 
better understand their effectiveness in achieving 
environmental outcomes.
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CASE STUDY
SUPPLEMENTARY BIODIVERSITY 
PAYMENTS FOR REDD+
An international climate finance mechanism for 
reducing emissions from deforestation 
(REDD+) is expected to provide substantial 
benefits for biodiversity.  By financing the 
conservation of tropical forests for their 
greenhouse gas abatement value, REDD+ 
would be safeguarding habitat for the majority 
of the world’s terrestrial species as well.  But 
conservationists have an opportunity to 
increase the biodiversity benefits of REDD+ 
still further. By supplementing REDD+ finance 
with biodiversity payments, conservation 
organisations could guide market demand for 
REDD+ toward high-biodiversity forests.  By 
leveraging the vast infrastructure being put in 
place for REDD+ - systems for forest 
conservation, monitoring, accounting and 
governance - transaction and startup costs 
could be far lower than under a project-by-
project approach to biodiversity conservation. 
Simulations using the OSIRIS model indicate 
that supplementing carbon finance with 
biodiversity payments would not only increase 
biodiversity benefits, but carbon benefits as 
well. In some forests carbon finance alone may 
be enough to incentivize conservation. But in 
forests where carbon finance alone is 
insufficient, biodiversity payments would act as 
a subsidy, allowing combined carbon and 
biodiversity payments to conserve forests 
where costs would otherwise be too high.
A price premium for emissions reductions 
originating in high-biodiversity forests could be 
paid either by existing buyers of REDD+, or by a 
new set of buyers interested primarily in forest 
biodiversity.  This price premium could be paid 
through: 
• Providing additional up-front finance to 
develop high-biodiversity REDD+ programs 
or projects;
• Purchasing high-biodiversity REDD+ 
credits above market price and reselling at 
regular market price; or
• Rewarding sellers of high-biodiversity 
REDD+ credits with a “biodiversity 
matching payment”.
To implement any of these supplemental 
biodiversity payment methods, three additional 
global institutional investments would 
be useful:
A registry identifying the spatial origin of 
emission reductions would allow potential 
buyers of biodiversity to decide which forests 
are rich enough in biodiversity to merit a price 
premium. This registry may already be an 
important feature of international or national 
REDD+ programs even in the absence of 
supplemental biodiversity finance.
Standardised, accepted metrics for 
quantitatively differentiating forests’ relative 
biodiversity value would relieve individual 
buyers of the cost of gathering this information. 
Arriving at appropriate and accurate metrics for 
biodiversity value should result from an 
independent, transparent and science-based 
process, and need not be under the auspices of 
the UNFCCC. 
A centralized institution ccould consolidate 
demand for the biodiversity benefits of avoided 
deforestation from many small and 
geographically dispersed potential buyers.
Jonah Busch, Ph.D. (Conservation International)
See Busch, J. “Mechanisms for increasing the 
biodiversity benefit of reducing emissions from 
deforestation.”
http://www.conservation.org/osiris
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INSURANCE AND GUARANTEES 
Insurance and guarantees and are a way to leverage private sector 
investment in natural capital projects . Insurance is used to reduce 
the overall risk seen by an investor and can be used in developing 
countries where insurers have experience of at least some of the 
risks involved in investment related to natural capital (O’Sullivan 
et al., 2010). Guarantees are used to specifically insure against 
underperformance by governments and are therefore a more 
appropriate mechanism to stimulate investment in LDCs. 
(O’Sullivan et al., 2010).
Whilst insurance is typically provided by the private sector, 
public-sector finance could be used to subsidise insurance 
premiums for ecosystem investments (Gaines and Grayson, 2009). 
Guarantees are typically provided by host country governments, 
multilateral organisations such as the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency15 (MIGA), and development banks. Public 
organisations like MIGA are in a better position than private 
investors to leverage relationships with governments and reduce 
political risk.
Based on hypothetical REDD-specific guarantees provided by 
multilateral institutions, ecosystem finance delivered as 
guarantees could have a leverage factor of around 1:5.5-1:6 (Gaines 
and Grayson, 2009)16. Although insurance and guarantees are 
useful delivery mechanisms, they address the symptoms but not 
the causes of the barriers to increased private-sector investment 
(O’Sullivan et al., 2010). Additional finance, likely in the form of 
grants (see page 102), performance-based payments (see page 103) 
and concessional lending (see page 104), will therefore be needed 
to help remove those barriers.
15. A member of the 
World Bank Group
16. Leverage factors for 
insurance are harder to 
estimate.
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UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Alongside the decision on how to generate and deliver finance for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services is the equally important 
consideration of how to govern and coordinate that finance. This 
section explores the various institutional arrangements that have 
been proposed to manage the flows of international ecosystem 
finance. The institutional arrangements that are covered in this 
analysis could be implemented at the sub-national, national 
and international level across developed and developing 
country Parties.
THE STATE OF PLAY
Currently, LifeWeb (page 136) and the GEF (page 122) are the sole 
institutions related to mobilising and managing financial 
resources to achieve the CBD mandate. Outside of the CBD 
process, biodiversity-specific finance is provided through an array 
of bilateral initiatives as well as through civil society and 
businesses, in a number of different ways. Additionally, several 
bilateral and multilateral funds have recently emerged related to 
climate finance, which offer potential co-benefits for biodiversity, 
but these funds lie primarily outside the CBD mandate, so strong 
institutional cooperation will be required to maximise those 
co-benefits. 
A proliferation of institutions and funding channels at the 
international and national level has led to a fragmented, 
decentralised model (page 140) in which developing countries 
face an array of uncoordinated funding sources. The multiplication 
of funds and other financing channels with different governance 
structures and approaches makes the management of these 
revenue streams complicated for recipients at the national and 
project level. Additionally, fragmentation of funding can lead 
to competing centres of authority and a duplication of 
funding efforts.
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1. Non-papers No. 34 
and 54 are relevant to  
the contact group on 
enhanced action on the 
provision of financial 
resources and investment 
and are available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/
kyoto_protocol/
application/
pdf/54fin61109.pdf 
2. Taken from the 
latest non-paper No. 54, 
as well as the paper on 
common elements 
presented at AWG-LCA 6 
in Bonn in August 
available at http://
unfccc.int/files/
meetings/ad_hoc_
working_groups/lca/
application/pdf/
finance140809.pdf.
A BRIEF HISTORY
In relation to the management of financial resources, Article 21 of 
the Convention states:
“21(3): The Conference of the Parties shall review the effectiveness 
of the mechanism established under this Article (…). Based on such 
review, it shall take appropriate action to improve the 
effectiveness of the mechanism if necessary.”
“21(4): The Contracting Parties shall consider strengthening 
existing financial institutions to provide financial resources for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.”
A review process is currently underway, aimed at substantially 
enhancing international financial flows and domestic funding for 
biological diversity, in order to achieve a substantial reduction of 
the current funding gaps for effective implementation of the 
Convention’s three objectives.
Decision IX/11, B (4) of the Conference of the Parties, adopted in 
2008, adds:
“IX/11 B (4): Invites Parties to come forward with new and 
innovative financial mechanisms in support of the strategy 
for resource mobilization in accordance with Article 20 of 
the Convention.”
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INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FRAMEWORK
CRITERIA
The diagram below presents a framework that can be used to 
analyse and understand the different proposals that have been put 
forward for institutional arrangements. The framework comprises 
four criteria as follows:
Institutions: Will new institutions be required?
Coherence: Will there be consolidation or 
fragmentation of funding streams?
Devolution: Who will make spending decisions?
Approval: Who will approve funding for projects 
and programmes?
Using these criteria allows us to compare individual proposals and 
to collectively see areas of convergence or divergence. 
The criteria and proposals that are discussed in this section are 
predominantly related to the decision-making processes within 
the overall financial mechanism. There will inevitably be overlap, 
however, between this module and the normative components 
of revenue generation and delivery. For clarity and understanding, 
decisions and criteria related to the generation 
and delivery of finance have been discussed in the previous 
two sections.
The following pages show how these criteria can be used to 
understand proposals for institutional arrangements.
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EFFECTIVE / EFFICIENT
COHERENCE
Will there be consolidation of 
fragmentation of funding streams?
 
DEVOLUTION
Who will make spending decisions? 
 
APPROVAL
Who will approve funding for projects 
and programmes ?
PRINCIPLE 
CRITERION 
EQUITABLE / TRANSPARENT
INSTITUTIONS 
Will new institutions be required?
INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS
Figure 8. A framework 
for understanding 
Institutional 
Arrangements
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CASE STUDY
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 
FACILITY (GEF)
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was 
established in 1991 and is the largest single 
funder of environmental projects having to date 
allocated USD 8.8 billion to over 2,400 
projects in 165 developing countries and 
economies in transition (EITs)1.
DELIVERY OF FINANCE FOR BIODIVERSITY
Finance under the GEF is delivered through 
unconditional grants to cover the ‘incremental 
costs’ of actions to protect the environment. 
The GEF funds projects across six focal areas: 
biodiversity, climate change, international 
waters, land degradation, the ozone layer, and 
persistent organic pollutants. The goal of the 
biodiversity focal area – in line with the 
objectives of the CBD - is the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity and the 
maintenance of ecosystem goods and services. 
To achieve this goal, the current GEF 
biodiversity strategy encompasses four 
objectives: to improve the sustainability of 
protected area systems; to mainstream 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use 
into production landscapes/seascapes and 
sectors; to build capacity to implement the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety; and to build 
capacity on access to genetic resources and 
benefit sharing.
The average annual funding for the biodiversity 
focal area was USD 135 million in 1991-
20042, although this figure is perhaps an 
underestimate of the total finance for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, which 
often benefit from finance for other focal areas 
such as international waters (Pearce, 2004).
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OF THE GEF
The governance structure of the GEF is 
composed of the Assembly, the Council, the 
Secretariat, 10 agencies, a Scientific and 
Technical Advisory Panel (STAP), and the 
Independent Office of Monitoring and 
Evaluation (see Figure 9). 
The Assembly is made up of all 176 member 
countries, or Participants. It meets every four 
years at the ministerial level to review the 
general policies, operations, membership and 
potential amendments to the GEF. The Council 
is the main governing body of the GEF 
comprising 14 donor Participants and 18 
recipient Participants. The Council meets every 
six months and is responsible for developing, 
adopting and evaluating the operational policies 
and programs for GEF-financed activities, as 
well as reviewing and approving the work 
program (projects submitted for approval)3. 
The GEF Secretariat coordinates the overall 
implementation of GEF activities. It services 
and reports to the Assembly and the Council.
 
The GEF has 10 implementing Agencies that 
act as the operational arm of the GEF. The 
Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) 
provides independent advice to the GEF on 
scientific and technical aspects of programs 
and policies. The members of STAP are 
appointed by the Executive Director of UNEP, 
in consultation with the GEF’s CEO, the 
Administrator of UNDP, and the President of 
the World Bank. 
The Independent Office of Monitoring and 
Evaluation (M&E) provides a basis for 
decision-making on amendments and 
improvements of policies, strategies, 
programme management, procedures and 
projects; promotes accountability for resource 
use against project objectives; documents and 
provides feedback to subsequent activities; and 
promotes knowledge management on results, 
performance and lessons learned.
1. The information presented here has been taken from http://www.thegef.org and http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/
gef-trust-fund
2. Taken from http://207.190.239.143/projects/Focal_Areas/focal_areas.html
3. As decisions are made by consensus, two-thirds of the Members of the Council constitute a quorum.
Figure 9. Structure of 
the GEF adapted from 
http://thegef.org/gef/
gef_structure
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GEF
The GEF is replenished every four years by 
donors and contributions to the fund are 
considered ODA by donor countries. In 
November 2006, under the GEF-4 
replenishment, thirty-two donor countries 
pledged USD 3.13 billion to fund operations 
until June, 2010. Under the current GEF-5 
replenishment USD 4.25 billion is being 
pledged from thirty-four donor countries 
for the period 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2014 
(see Figure 10).
Figure 10. Contributions 
by donor countries 
to the GEF-5 
replenishment
To date GEF financing has been complemented 
by more than USD 38.7 billion in co-financing. 
One of the central questions, however, is the 
extent to which both GEF funds and co-
financing are truly ‘additional’ as required by 
the Rio Conventions on climate and biodiversity 
(Pearce, 2004) (see page 44 for a discussion 
of additionality). Since ODA for the 
environment as a proportion of total ODA has 
declined in recent years (Castro and Hammond, 
2009), one argument is that GEF 
replenishments and co-financing are not new 
and additional finance, but are simply diverted 
from other financing channels.
CONTRIBUTION 
AS 1/100TH OF 
A % OF GDP
GEF 
CONTRIBUTION
USD (MILION)
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The second consideration for institutions is to what extent there 
will be consolidation of different revenue generation streams.
Options: Consolidated, Fragmented
As outlined in the revenue generation section, there are a 
multitude of mechanisms available to generate revenue for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services. A key question for the 
institutional arrangements of a financial mechanism will be 
whether funding streams will remain fragmented or whether they 
will be consolidated.
The level of coherence of revenue streams is a spectrum, ranging 
from a fully consolidated global fund at one end to a completely 
fragmented financial architecture at the other. The fully 
consolidated funding model would require all global ecosystem 
finance to be channelled through a single entity. At the other end 
of the funding spectrum, a fragmented system would involve no 
aggregation of finance and recipients would face a multitude of 
discrete and uncoordinated funding streams.
The consolidation, or at least the coordination, of funding streams 
both at the national and the international level is an important 
requirement for funding mechanisms (Muller, 2009), as it is 
unlikely that distribution of these funds to different themes (see 
page 94) or groups (see the participation criterion on page 91) 
can be achieved in the absence of coordinated management of 
these funds.
Furthermore, the fragmentation of funding streams at the 
international level makes the management of funds in recipient 
countries complex and can lead to competing centres of authority 
and a duplication of funding efforts at the national level {Brown, 
2009 #7}. Another serious problem with fragmented funding 
streams is that it has proven very difficult in the past to monitor, 
report and verify the flow of finance, even when carried out as part 
of a ‘political commitment’ {Müller, 2009 #9}. These are both 
issues that cannot be overcome so easily with coordination, and 
call for some degree of consolidation.
3. Proposals for 
consolidated funding  
do not preclude the 
existence of other 
funding sources; they 
state, however, that 
finance delivered outside 
the consolidated fund 
cannot be counted 
against developed 
country commitments 
under the Convention.
CONSOLIDATED FRAGMENTEDINSTITUTIONS
The first criterion for institutional arrangements describes 
how existing institutions will play a role in a future 
financial mechanism.
Options: New, Reformed
Whilst there are a multitude of organisations and financing 
channels available for biodiversity and ecosystem services, they 
are not designed to deal with the scale of financing that is required 
to meet the objectives of the CBD. This status quo leaves two 
possible alternatives: either create new institutions or reform 
existing ones.
Under a reformed approach, existing institutions, such as the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) (see page 122) or existing 
conservation trust funds, would be improved or made ‘fit for 
purpose’. This could mean reform within institutions (e.g. GEF), 
but could also mean reform in a broader sense of changing the 
number of and/or coordination between institutions of the same 
type (e.g. CTFs). The alternative to reform is to create new and 
appropriate institutions to enable the objectives of the Convention 
to be fulfilled. The debate around new versus reformed institutions 
is largely one of control. A central argument for creating new 
institutions is that the existing institutions typically represent the 
views and interests of developed country Parties, or the 
constituents of developed countries (e.g. through Philanthropy or 
other private mechanisms). Developing countries therefore see 
new institutional arrangements as a way to achieve equitable 
representation and more direct access to finance, particularly 
international sources.
As with other criteria outlined here, the decision to reform existing 
institutions or to create new institutions is not binary. Both 
scenarios would require a transition period, and some degree of 
both is likely required. The institutional arrangements presented 
here, however, have a stronger element of one option over the other.
NEW REFORMED
APPROVAL
This final criterion describes who will approve funding for projects 
programmes and activities in developing countries.
Options: Centralised, Decentralised
There are two ways in which decisions related to the approval of 
funding can be made. Decision-making can either be centralised, 
under a national or international governing body; or decentralised, 
whereby individual donors or recipients make decisions on how 
finance is used. The current model for financing (with a few 
exceptions) is decentralised, in which decisions about how finance 
for biodiversity and ecosystem services is generated and delivered 
are retained (see page 128) by a fragmented (see page 124) array of 
bi- and multi-lateral donor organisations.  This approach is 
typically not favoured by the recipients of finance due to the lack 
of involvement in decision making processes. An alternative (and 
more equitable) proposition would be a decentralised model in 
which decision making is devolved to the recipients of finance.
The alternative to a decentralised approach is a centralised 
approach, in which decisions relating to how finance should be 
generated and delivered would be taken centrally by a national or 
international body. At the international level the governing body 
could be under the authority or guidance of the Parties to the CBD 
(see the GEF on page 122) or it could be a multilateral fund under 
the World Bank.  Similarly, at the national level the governing body 
could be under the authority of the national government or a 
non-governmental organisation. Due to issues of political capture 
(see page 46), it may be preferable at the national-level to establish 
funds that are legally separate entities from national governments. 
As discussed above, under a devolved model, decentralised 
decision-making relieves international bodies of an otherwise 
unmanageable number of operational decisions related to the 
approval of funding activities (Müller and Gomez-Echeverri, 
2009). An element of centralised authority is desirable, however, 
for certain types of capacity building and technology-transfer 
activities (Müller, 2009).
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A further consideration for institutional arrangements is the 
choice of where and how decisions are made on the delivery of 
finance and who makes them.
Options: Devolved, Retained
In general, spending decisions can either be made by recipients of 
finance (devolved) or by donors (retained). As with the coherence 
criterion, the choice of devolution will be one of degrees; that is, 
some funding models will require more or less devolution than 
others in the delivery of finance. The current financial 
architecture, with a few exceptions, uses a retained model in which 
decisions on how finance is delivered are made by donors.
The subsidiarity principle encourages decisions to be made at the 
lowest or least centralised competent authority. The devolution of 
funding decisions is vital in ensuring both national- and 
community-level ownership of actions to conserve biodiversity and 
ensure ecosystem service provision. It also provides ‘direct access’ 
to funding and leaves the option for both off-budget and on-budget 
funding streams.
Devolved or national-level decision-making also relieves 
international bodies of an otherwise unmanageable number of 
operational decisions related to the approval of activities and 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of support (Müller 
and Gomez-Echeverri, 2009). As decision-making is devolved 
further, however, monitoring of how financing is being used will 
likely need to increase.
4. The principle of 
subsidiarity is central to 
the ongoing UNFCCC 
negotiations and has 
been promoted by a 
number of Parties under 
the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action  
under the Convention 
(AWG-LCA)
DEVOLVED RETAINED
INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
PROPOSALS
A GUIDE TO INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The following pages present a guide to four options for the 
institutional arrangement of finance for biodiversity and 
ecosystem services using the framework presented above. Each 
option is represented graphically using the icons shown overleaf. 
These icons represent the main options from the analytical 
framework, and have been grouped into their respective criteria.
The icons will be presented to the side of each proposal in an ‘icon 
bar’ shown here on the left. Not all proposals aim to define all of the 
criteria of the framework. To simplify matters, all icons in the icon 
bar will be greyed out by default and only the options that are 
explicitly proposed in the submissions will be highlighted 
in colour.
For example the ‘icon bar’ shown on the left indicates that this 
hypothetical institution would use a new, consolidated fund with 
devolved and decentralised decision-making.
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CONSERVATION TRUST FUND
A consevation (or environmental) trust fund (CTF) is a central 
pool of ecosystem finance managed by an entity that is legally 
independent from the institutions from which financing is 
generated. CTFs have three primary structures: Endowments 
invest principal capital in perpetuity, and only investment income 
or interest on the endowment is spent; Sinking funds spend a 
portion of principal investment along with the investment income;  
Revolving funds are maintained by earmarked revenue 
generated through taxes, fees, etc. 
Approximately 55 CTFs already exist worldwide (CFA, 2008) and  
work at the national (e.g., FONAFIFO  on page 118) or sub-national 
level (e.g. FONAG, page 60). Some CTFs are also starting to reform 
and consolidate into CTFs that work not by political boundaries, 
but at the eco-region level, which is particularly useful for, e.g., 
transboundary tropical forests .
One important feature is that, over the lifetime of the fund, a CTF 
can leverage the revenue it recieves (see page 96), which is very 
clear for an endowment fund. Whilst CTFs have traditionally 
delivered finance through grants delivered to protected area 
systems, funds have emerged recently that deliver performance-
based payments in exchange for ecosystem services (see e.g. 
FONAFIFO and FONAG). There has also been a donor-driven push 
to finance more sustainable use activities rather than strict 
conservation (CFA, 2008).
Conservation funds usually support national government’s 
sustainable development objectives, and whilst they can be 
established by governments, they are often legally separate 
entities. This is an important consideration when receiving 
revenue from a domestic tax or other national level mechanism 
that is traditionally difficult to hypothecate (e.g. the petrol tax in 
Costa Rica , see page 118). Allocating national funds to 
conservation funds has seen only moderate success in avoiding 
revenue capture (see page 43). Allocating international funds in 
this manner, however seems much more succesful based on 
experience with debt-for-nature swaps (page 55).
7. The Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS) is  
a coalition of some 43 
low-lying and small 
island countries, most  
of which are members of 
the G-77, that are 
particularly vulnerable  
to sea-level rise. 
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8. This could be 
an existing institution  
such as the GEF or  
World Bank.7 The G7 
 
9.+ China also 
propose that delivery 
should be primarily 
grant-based (particularly 
for adaptation),  
with concessional  
loan arrangements  
as appropriate.
CLEARING HOUSE
A clearinghouse is an institutional arrangement that brings 
together buyers and sellers of biodiversity and ecosystem service 
projects. By providing a forum for sharing diversified projects, 
a clearinghouse makes it easier for buyers to locate and finance 
projects that match their needs, thereby lowering overall 
transaction costs. Whilst an exchange market (see page 138) 
requires a standard metric of exchange (e.g. hectares of forest 
restored), a clearinghouse can sell diversified projects to buyers 
with differing individual needs. As such, a clearinghouse is more 
appropriate in situations where markets are not yet fully 
developed, where projects deliver unstandardized or 
unmeasured benefits or in markets where most trades consist 
of one-off, bespoke purchases from a diversified group of buyers 
(see page 136).
An example of an international clearinghouse in action is the 
CBD’s LifeWeb (see page 136) that allows Parties who have 
committed to funding biodiversity protection in developing 
countries to easily find projects and programmes that meet their 
needs. An international private sector clearinghouse could also be 
useful if private sector demand for voluntary biodiversity offsets 
increases on a global scale (see BBOP on page 70). In addition to 
providing informational services, a clearinghouse could also 
provide a channel for transferring finance from buyers to sellers, 
which could further lower transaction costs and help achieve 
economies of scale. Importantly, a clearinghouse is primarily a 
platform of information, so even if a finance channel were provided 
a clearinghouse would not consolidate finance and nor would it 
have authority over how the funding is raised or delivered. 
As shown by LifeWeb, a clearinghouse can work at the 
international level but it can also be established domestically 
assuming the demand for projects is high enough to warrant it. 
Such an institutional arrangement would be useful in countries 
with regulation that makes the private sector liable for their impact 
on biodiversity and ecosystems, but for political reasons choose 
not to use a standard metric. This may be the case in high 
biodiversity areas where offsetting requires a strict like-for-like 
equivalency (eftec, IEEP, et al., 2010).
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CASE STUDY
THE LIFEWEB INITIATIVE
GOAL AND MANDATE 
The LifeWeb Initiative is a partnership platform 
that strengthens financing for protected areas 
to conserve biodiversity, secure livelihoods 
and address climate change, through 
implementation of the CBD Programme of Work 
on Protected Areas (PoWPA). LifeWeb provides 
a user-friendly clearing house for countries to 
profile their financial priorities and invite 
international support, facilitates funding 
matches, coordinates counterpart financing 
among donors, and recognises donor support 
and innovation in ecosystem finance.    
The LifeWeb Initiative was launched in 
May 2008 during CBD COP 9, in Bonn, 
Germany and is a process managed by the 
CBD Secretariat. Decision IX/18 on Protected 
Areas welcomed the efforts of the LifeWeb 
Initiative and noted the opportunities Parties 
and other organizations have to participate in 
this initiative. 
HOW IT WORKS
Developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition that are Parties to the 
CBD are invited to submit invitations for 
support of their protected area funding 
priorities using the ‘Expressions of Interest’ 
template. These submissions provide an 
overview of protected area funding needs and 
must be consistent with priorities defined in 
national plans and advance the implementation 
of the CBD PoWPA. To ensure that Expressions 
of Interest are consistent with national 
priorities, submissions must be made by a CBD 
focal point, specifically the National Focal 
Point or the Focal Point for the PoWPA, or by 
indigenous or local community groups, 
accompanied by an endorsement letter from a 
Focal Point. Submissions are then profiled on 
LifeWeb’s interactive clearing-house map. The 
LifeWeb coordination office also proactively 
shares project concepts with multiple donors 
interested in funding a wide range of activities 
related to the implementation of the PoWPA. 
It also provides assistance to help strengthen 
submissions in order to make them as attractive 
as possible to committed and potential donors.
For recipients, LifeWeb provides:
 • A user-friendly platform to profile   
 national priorities;
 • A mechanism to communicate  funding  
 needs to multiple donors  simultaneously;
 • Support in co-convening donor   
 coordination meetings;
 • Technical input for the design of   
 compelling Expressions of Interest; and 
 • Resource materials and guidance   
 about the value of protected areas.
For donors, LifeWeb offers:
 • A user-friendly platform to view   
 recipient priorities;
 • Recognition of their support and 
 innovation for natural solutions;
 • Identification of opportunities for   
 counterpart funding;
 • Use and strengthening existing   
 development cooperation mechanisms;
 • Consistency with the Paris   
 Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
As of July 2010, the LifeWeb Initiative has 
profiled more than 60 submissions from over 
40 countries, totalling approximately 350 
million dollars.
FEATURED MATCHES
Tanzania Livelihoods and Forest 
Conservation Project
In March 2010, the Government of Finland 
announced its support for Tanzania’s 
Livelihoods and Forest Conservation Project, 
marking the first project Finland contributed to 
as a partner in the LifeWeb Initiative. The 
Government of Finland contributed EUR 
250,000, a little more than half the total cost 
of the project, with the remaining balance 
coming from the Tanzanian government through 
the National Parks authority, the Frankfurt 
Zoological Society, and The Nature 
Conservancy. The project targets the local 
communities that live in the buffer zones of two 
existing protected areas, the Gombe National 
Park and the Mahale Mountains National Park, 
the only national parks with chimpanzees in 
Tanzania. It assists local communities in 
developing village land use plans, conservation-
friendly businesses, environmental education 
activities, and climate change adaptation 
strategies to address biodiversity threats and 
strengthen local livelihoods. 
Forever Costa Rica
Covering less than one tenth of 1% of Earth’s 
surface, Costa Rica still hosts as 
much as 5% of the world’s biodiversity. 
Although 26% of the country’s land area is 
placed under various protection management 
categories, Costa Rica’s current marine 
protected areas are inadequate to support its 
collapsing fisheries and its national parks suffer 
from insufficient and uncertain financing. 
To help Costa Rica reach its goals, The Nature 
Conservancy, the Gordon and Betty Moore 
Foundation, and the Linden Trust for 
Conservation are partnering with the 
government of Costa Rica and others, to ensure 
not only the creation of protected areas, but 
also the permanent financing for management 
of those areas in Costa Rica. 
Forever Costa Rica will double the country’s 
marine protected areas, establish an 
independent trust to provide long term support 
to this expansion, and manage marine and 
terrestrial protected areas. Under the terms of 
the pending agreement with the Costa Rican 
government, over USD 50 million of external 
private and public funding will be placed in a 
permanent trust, leveraging the Costa Rican 
government’s ongoing funding of USD 19 
million annually, thus sustaining long-term 
funding for protected areas.
For more information see www.cbd.int/lifeweb
EXCHANGE MARKET
An exchange market links buyers and sellers of biodiversity and 
ecosystem service offsets and credits using a standard metric of 
exchange (e.g. hectare of forest), making credits easily tradable. In 
other words, unlike a clearinghouse, which is project-based, an 
exchange market is credit-based.
The units of exchange in an exchange market can be relatively 
simplistic or more complex measures that account for 
combinations of area impacted, ecosystem services impacted, or 
priority level of biodiversity impacted, etc. The fungilibty4 of 
credits will be crucial in determining potential market size and 
complexity. Simpler units of exchange (e.g. hectares of habitat or 
tonnes of carbon) lend themselves to a broader market reach, and 
would be simpler to arrange institutionally; they are therefore 
often used for the exchange of ecosystem-service-based credits 
(e.g. forest carbon markets). Markets with more complex 
approaches to the metric of exchange, sometimes described as 
registry-based markets, exhibit elements of both a true exhange 
market and a clearhinghouse. Further, they require greater 
institutional capacity, and are generally only used on a sub-
national, national, or regional scale; they are therefore more 
applicable for programmes of biodiversity protection (see 
Australian Biodiversity Markets on page 136).
As with a clearinghouse mechanism, exchange markets would not 
consolidate financing nor have authority over it. In contrast to a 
clearinghouse arrangement, however, since less information is 
provided about how credits are originated, the decision on delivery 
of finance is devolved to the project developers.
140 141
4. The tradability of 
credits for commodities 
including biodiversity 
and ecosystem services 
is often referred to 
as fungibility.
CASE STUDY
AUSTRALIAN ‘MARKETS’ FOR 
NATIVE VEGETATION
Roughly half of the world’s biodiversity 
offsetting programmes are funded by buyers 
that require ‘one-off’ offsets that are generally 
negotiated between the developer and the 
regulator; and these trades could easily be 
facilitated through a clearinghouse mechanism 
(see page 135). There are also examples of 
more market-like institutions being used to 
protect biodiversity, in which a brokerage or 
registry is generally required to support the 
exchange of more complex credits associated 
with biodiversity exchange markets (see page 
138). Australia provides two good examples of 
such markets. 
The BushBroker programme in the state of 
Victoria a government-assisted offset-brokering 
service that facilitates the supply of native 
vegetation offsets.  Market demand is created 
by a permitting system that regulates clearing 
of native vegetation5. To facilitate supply, the 
BushBroker programme identifies landowners 
willing to preserve and manage native 
vegetation on their property and then a 
government or accredited private assessor 
determines the potential number and type of 
credits available on the site using the ‘habitat 
hectares’ measurement methodology.
Credits are created under this methodology 
through conservation gains from management 
actions, protection, maintenance of quality, 
and improvements of quality specified in a 
permanent on-title agreement signed by the 
landowner. The BushBroker programme keeps 
a database of willing landowners that permit-
holders requiring offsets can search to find an 
appropriate offset.  BushBroker has also seen 
several habitat banks initiated in the program 
and will be expanding banking by creating a 
pool of supply for its ‘over-the-counter’ 
programme. Over 200 transactions have been 
completed to date.
While Victoria focuses on brokering services for 
one-off offsets, in the neighbouring state of 
New South Wales, the BioBanking program 
uses a registry to support the creation of credits 
in BioBanks.  Like BushBroker, private 
landowners provide a supply of ecosystem and 
species credits to developers needing to comply 
with environmental regulation (essentially to 
offset their negative impacts on ecosystems). 
Negative impacts (and therefore the demand 
for offsets) are calculated by accredited 
assessors using the ‘BioBanking Assessment 
Methodology’ and its associated ‘Credit 
Calculator’ software. Credits are created 
through land protection and management (i.e., 
managing grazing, fire, weeds, and human 
disturbance) carried out by the landowner as 
specified in each BioBank agreement.
The New South Wales Department of Energy 
and Climate Change (DECC) maintains a 
registry of these agreements that provides 
information on the nature of the credits 
(searchable by location, ecosystem or species 
type), landowners interested in creating 
BioBanks, and credit transactions and sales. 
The programme also features a government-run 
‘BioBanking Trust Fund’  to ensure sufficient 
funding for ongoing maintenance of BioBank 
sites. When a credit sale occurs, a set amount 
is sent to the Trust Fund that distributes funds 
on an annual basis. The remaining portion of 
the sale is the profit to the landowner. 
Currently, only one BioBank has been 
established but applications for another five 
sites are being assessed.
Becca Madsen, Ecosystem Marketplace 
5. The 2002 Native Vegetation Management Framework
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FRAGMENTED AND DECENTRALISED 
Under a fragmented and decentralised model a very large number 
of actors work in a relatively uncoordinated manner to implement 
projects and programmes. This model is generally associated with 
more traditional ecosystem finance, which in the context of 
developing countries is dominated by ODA.
The current aid architecture provides an indication of the current 
status of institutional arrangements for ecosystem finance. There 
are over 2,500 individual donor/recipient relationships for the 
delivery of ODA, 60% which are used for environment aid, and the 
proliferation of actors for environment aid has occurred twice as 
fast as within ODA (Castro and Hammond, 2009).
Some level of decentralisation is desirable within the context of a 
consolidated fund such as the GEF to relieve central institutions of 
an otherwise unmanageable number of funding decisions (Müller 
and Gomez-Echeverri, 2009). Equally some level of fragmentation 
is required as different financial mechanisms will lend themselves 
more to different activities.
As ecosystem finance is scaled up, therefore, particularly from 
fragmented sources such as ODA, it will be important to make full 
use of the existing channels available.  Those channels must be 
used rationally, however, with some level of coordination of finance 
and decentralisation of decision making, particularly those related 
to the approval of funding. Learning from discussions under the 
climate change regime, an element of centralised authority can be 
particularly useful for some capacity building and technology-
transfer activities (Muller, 2009).
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GENERATION
SCALE: 
CURRENT AND 
FUTURE SCALE 
OF FINANCE
This diagram shows 
the current (white) 
and future (pink) 
scale of ecosystem 
finance. The size of 
each bar indicates 
the average amount 
that could be raised 
through each 
mechanism. Future 
scales are for the 
year 2020.
REVENUE GENERATION CAN BE SCALED UP 
SIGNIFICANTLY BY 2020 USING MECHANISMS 
THAT LEVERAGE FINANCE FROM OTHER 
MARKETS. WHILST, THESE OPTIONS DELIVER 
THE LARGEST SCALE OF FINANCE THEY ARE THE 
MOST POLITICALLY CHALLENGING TO IMLEMENT.
CURRENTLY, THE MAJORITY OF ECOSYSTEM 
FINANCE IS RAISED THROUGH DOMESTIC 
GOVERNMENT ALLOCATION. THE LEVEL OF 
FINANCE FROM NATIONAL BUDGETS IS 
UNLIKELY TO INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY IN 
FUTURE YEARS.
DIRECT PAYMENTS FOR BIODIVERSITY AND 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (E.G. BIODIVERSITY 
OFFSETS) AND INDIRECT PAYMENTS (E.G. 
BONDS) COULD RAISE AN ADDITIONAL USD 64 
BILLION IN ECOSYSTEM FINANCE BY 2020.
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GENERATION DELIVERY
USD 9.3 US GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON LAND CONSERVATION
USD 6.4 PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE INCLUDING PHILANTHROPY
USD 7.0 CHINESE GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS FOR WATERSHED SERVICES
USD 5.9
INTERNATIONAL 
FLOW OF FINANCE 
FROM DEVELOPED 
TO DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
DEVELOPING
DEVELOPED
148
73%
27%
58%
42%
USD 3.7 IS TRANSFERRED THROUGH OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
USD 3.5 EU AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL PAYMENTS
GENERATION
SCALE: 
FLOWS OF 
FINANCE FROM 
DEVELOPED TO 
DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES
This diagram 
shows the scale of 
finance raised and 
delivered in 
developed and 
developing 
countries.
Dotted lines 
indicate the portion 
of that finance 
going to indvidual 
schemes.
DOMESTIC SPENDING BY DEVELOPED COUNTRY 
GOVERNMENTS CURRENTLY ACCOUNTS FOR THE 
LARGE MAJORITY OF ECOSYSTEM FINANCE. THE 
CHALLENGE IS FOR DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO 
STRENGTHEN DOMESTIC EFFORTS, WHILST ALSO 
SUPPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES‘ EFFORTS 
TO CONSERVE BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEMS.
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE MORE DIRECTLY 
DEPENDENT ON BIODIVERSITY AND 
ECOSYSTEMS FOR THEIR LIVELIHOODS, AND THE 
THREAT TO ECOSYSTEMS IS MORE ACUTE.
AS THE SCALE OF ECOSYSTEM FINANCE 
INCREASES, A GREATER PROPORTION OF IT 
NEEDS TO BE DELIVERED TO DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES WHERE THE MAJORITY OF THE 
WORLD’S BIODIVERSITY LIES.
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GENERATION
SCALE: SCALES 
OF MARKETS
This diagram shows 
the ratio of 
finance between 
different market 
based mechanisms. 
The three bars 
indicate the current 
scale of finance in 
USD 15 
USD 42 
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OTHER MARKET MECHANISMS, INCLUDING 
TAXES ON BUNKER FUELS, A FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTION TAX OR SUBSIDY REFORM, 
COULD RAISE SIGNIFICANT NEW AND 
ADDITIONAL FINANCE FOR BIODIVERSITY 
AND ECOSYSTEMS. AS THESE MECHANISMS 
ARE NOT LINKED TO BIODIVERSITY, REVENUE 
WOULD LIKELY BE DIVIDED ACROSS 
BIODIVERSITY, CLIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT 
AGENDAS. IMPLEMENTING THEM IN A TIMELY 
AND EFFECTIVE MANNER WILL THEREOFRE
REQUIRE STRONG POLITICAL WILL, AND
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AMONG THE 
PROPONENTS OF BIODIVERSITY, CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT.
BONDS AND GREEN COMMODITIES HAVE
THE POTENTIAL TO RAISE OVER USD 30
BILLION IN ECOSYSTEM FINANCE. DUE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL NATURE OF
THESE MARKETS COUPLED WITH THE
INDIRECT PROVISION OF BIODIVERSITY
AND ECOSYSTEM BENEFITS, IT WOULD
BE MORE CHALLENGING TO ENSURE
THAT BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES ARE CONSERVED UNDER
THESE MECHANISMS.
FOREST CARBON OFFSET MARKETS
COULD RAISE UP TO USD 17 BILLION
DIRECTLY FOR BIODIVERSITY AND
ECOSYSTEMS BY 2020. TO ACHIEVE
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION WILL BE
REQUIRED TO REACH THE HIGH END OF
FINANCE THAT CAN BE RAISED
THROUGH THESE SCHEMES
NON MARKET MECHANISMS ARE
UNLIKELY TO GENERATE NEW AND
ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF FINANCE. 
THEMAJORITY OF THIS REVENUE IS
GENERATED THROUGH DOMESTIC
GOVERNMENT FUNDING
light grey, and the 
low (dark grey) and 
high (pink) future 
scale of finance 
from these 
mechanisms.
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DELIVERY
LANDSCAPE
This diagram
shows the
appropriateness
of different
mechanisms that
can be used to
deliver finance
across various
themes in less
developed
(including LDCs
and devloping
countries) and
more developed
countries
(including
developed and
developing)
countries.
CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE IN MORE 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES COULD BE FINANCED 
THROUGH PERFORMANCE-BASED PAYMENTS, 
CONDITIONAL MICROFINANCE, AND CONDITIONAL 
TAX INCENTIVES. MICROFINANCE SHOULD BE 
FOCUSED ON INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL TO 
MEDIUM SIzED ENTERPRISES FOR SUSTAINABLE 
ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE SOME FINANCIAL 
RETURNS. TAX INCENTIVES CAN COMPLEMENT 
THESE MECHANISMS, BY PROVIDING POSITIVE 
INCENTIVES FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR.
CAPACITY BUILDING AND TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER IN MORE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IS 
NOT AS MUCH OF A PRIORITY AT THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL, BUT MAY BE REQUIRED AT THE SUB-
NATIONAL LEVEL. SINCE SUB-NATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN MORE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
SHOULD HAVE BETTER CAPACITY TO ABSORB 
AND USE FINANCE, PERFORMANCE-BASED 
PAYMENTS COULD BE USED TO BUILD CAPACITY 
AROUND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICE PROVISION.
ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE NO FINANCIAL RETURN 
(THAT ARE CONSERVATION FOCUSED) CAN USE A 
MIX OF PERFORMANCE-BASED PAYMENTS, 
UNCONDITIONAL GRANTS AND NON-FINANCIAL 
INCENTIVES DEPENDING ON THE CONTEXT. 
CONCESSIONAL LOANS AND MICROFINANCE ARE 
MORE APPROPRIATE FOR ACTIVITIES WITH 
SOME LEVEL OF FINANCIAL RETURN (I.E. 
SUSTAINABLE USE) BUT WOULD NEED TO BE 
COMPLEMENTED WITH UNCONDITIONAL GRANTS 
IN THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. FOR THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR, POSITIVE TAX INCENTIVES, 
INSURANCE AND GUARANTEES CAN BE USED TO 
PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE BEHAVIOUR IN 
ENTERPRISES THAT PROVIDE BIODIVERSITY AND 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES.
CAPACITY BUILDING AND TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WILL 
REQUIRE GRANT-BASED SUPPORT. NON-
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES CAN ALSO BE USED TO 
IMPROVE CONDITIONALITY WITHIN 
COMMUNITY-LEVEL ACTIVITIES. NON-FINANCIAL 
INCENTIVES MAY ALSO BE MORE APPROPRIATE 
IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WHERE THERE 
ARE ISSUES OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY FOR 
FINANCE AND TO AVOID POLITICAL CAPTURE.
LEAST DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES 
DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
ADVANCED 
DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
CONSERVATION
SUSTAINABLE 
USE
CAPACITY 
 BUILDING
TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER
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INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS
LANDSCAPE
This diagram shows
the degree of
consolidation and
devolution of
institutional
arrangements. CONSERVATION TRUST FUND
Conservation trust funds
consolidate finance at the national
level, which makes it much simpler
for biodiversity and ecosystem
service providers to locate finance,
there by reducing costs. Care needs
to be taken that these funds do not
proliferate and become fragmented.
EXCHANGE MARKET
Exchange markets increase the fungibility 
of ecosystems, which permits broader 
market participation. Decision-making 
there by becomes more devolved to those 
that generate credits, which will in turn 
require better monitoring to ensure that 
biodiversity is being conserved and 
ecosystem services provided.
DEVOLVED FU
 N
D
A
s funds becom
e devolved, the
sellers w
ho need finance have
greater ease of access to it. 
A
 devolved fund could also have
qualities of an exchange m
arket if
it m
atches credits it sells on to
buyers to the projects that
providers execute.
CLEARIN
G H
OU
SE
The fragm
ented landscape of ecosystem
 
finance needs to be coordinated better. 
Institutional coordination requires better 
exchange of inform
ation betw
een buyers 
and providers of ecosystem
 services and 
biodiversity conservation. A
 clearing house 
approach w
ould thus provide an 
im
provem
ent over the current ecos ystem
 
finance landscape, im
proving efficiency 
through coordinating inform
ation and 
possibly even facilitating financial flow
s.
DEVOLVED
RETAINED
FRAGMENTED CONSOLIDATED 
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Financing biodiversity conservation and sustaining ecosystem services is an unresolved 
problem. This may seem surprising, given the amount of effort in recent years that has 
gone into justifying the expenditure, identifying priority investments, estimating the 
funding needed, and identifying potential sources of finance. But biodiversity 
conservation and the sustainable provision of ecosystem services turns out to be a tricky 
financing challenge, for several reasons.
The first issue is that many of the benefits of biodiversity and many ecosystem services 
can be considered ‘public goods’ (i.e. they are non-excludable and non-rivalrous). This 
means that firms who provide public biodiversity and ecosystem benefits cannot easily 
charge consumers for enjoying them, while at the same time people who are made worse 
off due to biodiversity and ecosystem loss cannot easily extract compensation from those 
responsible for the damage. In short, the market tends to ignore biodiversity altogether 
and many if not most ecosystem services. This problem can be solved using mechanisms 
that ‘internalize’ the public good value of natural capital in private production and 
consumption decisions, for example green commodities, subsidy reform, payment for 
ecosystem services and environmental offset schemes. Such mechanisms have the dual 
merit of directly addressing the economic drivers of biodiversity and ecosystem loss, 
while some also help to reduce pressure on government budgets. There is an urgent need 
to expand the use of these mechanisms in developing countries, where biodiversity is 
most concentrated, where the drivers of ecosystem loss are most intense, and where 
government budgets are most constrained.
The second reason that biodiversity and ecosystem services are chronically underfunded 
is that many of the public benefits of biodiversity and ecosystems services are enjoyed at 
a distance, far from the site of conservation – this is particularly the case for the non-use 
or ‘existence’ values of biodiversity. In contrast, most of the costs of conservation are 
incurred locally, notably the opportunity costs of forgoing certain uses of resources that 
are deemed incompatible with conservation. This disconnect poses a particular 
financing challenge, namely how to elicit sustainable funding from distant beneficiaries 
to compensate local communities for their loss of access to natural resources. While 
‘sustainable uses’ such as eco-tourism or bio-prospecting can help fill the funding gap, 
the revenues generated by such activities often look modest compared to the short-term 
profits, local jobs and government tax revenues promised by promoters of conventional, 
more destructive uses of natural resources. A significant expansion of international 
funding is needed to bridge the gap between the global beneficiaries and local providers 
of biodiversity and ecosystem services. Not all of this need come from public sources, 
although intergovernmental agreement is probably required to establish an effective 
enabling framework that can stimulate increased international finance for biodiversity 
conservation and ecosystem services from the private sector.
The third problem facing proponents of biodiversity conservation and ecosystem 
servicesis that we still have limited knowledge of the extent and value of natural capital, 
especially in marine environments. We know little about the functional value of 
biodiversity and other forms of natural capital, for instance, how the quantity and 
quality of ecosystem services vary with the diversity of genes, species and ecosystems. 
There is some evidence that we may be nearing ecological thresholds, where further 
biodiversity loss would result in the collapse of certain ecological functions and a 
dramatic decline in ecosystem services, but the precise nature and location of these 
thresholds remains very unclear. As a result, decision-makers don’t know which 
ecosystems or which components of biodiversity most need to be conserved, or where 
they need to be conserved, in order to maintain and increase human prosperity. In short, 
there is an urgent need to develop the natural capital knowledge base, particularly on the 
links between biodiversity, ecosystem services and the economy.
Despite these challenges, biodiversity conservation remains a priority for international 
finance for the simple reason that we lack technical substitutes for many of the benefits 
provided by nature. Not only is it impossible to bring extinct species back to life, but we 
also have no cost-effective substitutes for many - if not all - of the ecosystem services that 
we depend upon, such as the natural assimilation of waste and toxic material, 
regeneration of soils, pollination of important food plants, and other so-called 
‘regulating’ and ‘supporting’ services.
Some potential solutions to the biodiversity and ecosystem finance challenge are 
highlighted above, notably wider use of economic incentives to ‘internalize’ ecosystem 
values, more international funding for conservation, including private finance, and 
increased research on the links between biodiversity, ecosystem services and human 
well-being. In addition, there are a few immediate steps that need to be taken towards 
a more rational approach to biodiversity and ecosystem finance: 
• Track what is currently being spent on biodiversity and ecosystem services, 
including private as well as public expenditure, direct spending as well as indirect 
costs (such as positive tax incentives), the opportunity costs of protected areas 
(including ‘community conserved areas’), and the marginal costs of adopting 
‘ecosystem-friendly’ production practices; 
• Assess the relative effectiveness of different financial mechanisms, in terms 
of well-defined indicators of conservation outcome or, where feasible and 
appropriate, in terms of the economic value of ecosystem services delivered;
• Better understand the conservation funding gap for different components 
of natural capital, by preparing objective, independently-verified estimates in 
different parts of the world, expressed in terms of specific conservation outcomes 
and quantitative indicators.
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